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First Amendment (Un)Exceptionalism:
A Comparative Taxonomy of Campaign Finance
Reform Proposals in the United States and United
Kingdom
LORI

A. RINGHAND*
ABSTRACT

There is an urgent conversation happening among the world's
democracies about how to respond to the combined threat of online
electioneering and foreign interference in domestic elections. Despite
the shadow such activities cast over the 2016 presidential election in
the United States, the United States has been largely absent from
comparative discussions about how to tackle the problem. This is not
just because of a recalcitrantpresident. The assumption thatAmerica's
"FirstAmendment Exceptionalism" the idea that American freedom
of expression law is simply too much of an outlier to warrant useful
comparativeconsideration is strong on both sides of the Atlantic. This
is especially true in regardto the regulation of political campaigns.
This Article challenges that assumption, and argues that America's
more libertarianapproach to the legal regulation of political speech
does not pose a barriertofruitful comparative work in this area.It does
so by comparing the law of the United States to that of the United
Kingdom. Specifically, it organizes reform proposals being considered
in the United States and United Kingdom into a common taxonomy, and
sets out the legal standard governing each type of proposal in each
country. Considering each country's law through this organizational
structure allows us to see that the legal differences between the United
States and United Kingdom, while significant, rarely bar the types of
changes being considered in either nation. Indeed, the two countries
have much to learn from each other's efforts in this area, and

* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia College of Law; and Spring
2019 Fulbright Scotland Visiting Professor of Law, University of Aberdeen School of Law.
I am indebted to the U.S.-U.K. Fulbright Commission, the University of Aberdeen, and the
University of Georgia for their generous support of this project. I also have benefited from
thoughtful feedback provided by colloquium and conference participants at the Gresham
College Fulbright Lecture, the Centre for Law, Policy and Society at the University of
Southampton, the Centre for American Legal Studies at Birmingham City University School
of Law, and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2019 Annual Conference. Special
thanks are owed to Jacob Eisler, Heather Green, Richard L. Hasen, Daniel R. Lorentz, Joseph
S. Miller, Morgan Pollard, Robert Taylor, Daniel P. Tokaji, Sonja West, Paul Wragg, and
Stephen Wolfson. Errors are my own.

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:3

lawmakers, regulators,and scholars should not hesitate to engage with
the experiences of their transatlanticpeers.
In reaching this conclusion, the Article makes three distinct
contributions.First,by clustering reform proposals into a taxonomy, it
provides a structurefor comparative work that will be useful notjust in
the United States and United Kingdom, but in all countries working to
bring their election lawsfully into the internetera. Second, by providing
an in-depth yet accessible guide to the legal structures undergirding
election law in the United States and United Kingdom, it provides a
useful tool for scholars attempting to understand these systems. The
U.S. system in particularis often quickly dismissed by othernations, but
without a deeper understandingof how and why U.S. law has ended up
as it has, those nations risk inadvertently following in its footsteps.
Finally,it identifies several concrete areas where the United States and
United Kingdom can benefit from each other's expertise, thereby
providing a roadmapfor regulators,lawmakers, and reform advocates
in both countries.
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FIRST AMENDMENT (UN)EXCEPTIONALISM

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2016 presidential election in the United States and referendum on
European Union membership (Brexit) that same year in the United Kingdom
were a wake-up call to those nations about the extent to which disinformation,
propaganda, and "fake news" spread online can amplify extremism and
undermine democratic elections. Regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates
have responded by recommending a wide array of legal reforms, including
changes to the rules governing political campaigns. In both the United States
and the United Kingdom, this process has generated dozens of proposals to more
effectively counter online and foreign efforts to influence voters and destabilize
democratic institutions.
Despite this, there has been little cross-country analysis comparing those
proposals. This is not surprising. The assumption that America's "First
Amendment Exceptionalism"-the idea that American freedom of expression
law is simply too much of an outlier to warrant comparative consideration-is
widely held on both sides of the Atlantic.1 This is especially true in regard to the
regulation of political campaigns, where the United States is most commonly
held up in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) as a negative example to be
avoided at all costs. 2 In this Article, I challenge that assumption by
demonstrating that the legal differences between the United States and the
United Kingdom rarely bar the types of reform proposals being considered in
either country, and that the two countries can in fact gain considerable insight
from each other's efforts to bring their election laws fully into the internet era.
The Article has four parts. Part II illustrates the challenges faced in both
nations by briefly recapping what we know now about online and foreign
interference in the 2016 elections. 3 Part III contextualizes those challenges by
1 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech

Exceptionalism:Pervasive Distrustof Government and the ContemporaryFirstAmendment,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 659 (2015) ("[W]hen viewed from a global perspective, the American
position of affording near-absolute protection to speech is strongly exceptionalist.").
2 See R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [47] [48], [2008] 1 AC 1312 (Baroness Hale of Richmond) (appeal
taken from Eng.); COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE: THE
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4047-I,

1.16, at 18

(UK) [hereinafter NEILL REPORT]; Jacob Rowbottom, Animal Defenders International:
Speech, Spending, and a Change of Direction in Strasbourg, 5 J. MEDIA L. 1, 5 6 (2013);
ELECTORAL REFORM Soc'Y, REINING IN THE POLITICAL "WILD WEST": CAMPAIGN RULES

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (Michela Palese & Josiah Mortimer eds., Feb. 2019),
https://www.electoral-reform.rg.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/reining-in
-the -political -wild- west- campaign -rules-for-the -21 st-century/#sub -section-7 [https://
perma.cc/B3UA-82AN].
3Referendum campaigns like the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom are not
"elections" (since no candidate is elected). Unless otherwise specified, this Article
nonetheless uses the terms "elections" and "election laws" to refer to the full set of primary
and secondary legislation, court decisions, regulations, and rules governing both candidate
and referendum campaigns.
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introducing readers to the foundational rules governing campaign finance and
political party funding in the United States and United Kingdom. Part IV, which
is the heart of the Article, considers the most significant reform proposals being
discussed in each country and organizes them into a taxonomy. As Part IV
demonstrates, once the reform proposals are analyzed through this structure, it
becomes clear that the two countries have much to learn from each other, despite
their different legal rules. The Article concludes by highlighting several areas
where further comparative consideration would be the most valuable, and
encouraging regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in both countries to
more fully engage with each other's efforts in those areas.
II. THE 2016 ELECTIONS
The 2016 presidential election in the United States and the Brexit
referendum in the United Kingdom have been extensively studied. In the United
States, the Special Counsel to the U.S. Department of Justice, the intelligence
community, and select committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives have all investigated the presidential election. 4 In the United
Kingdom, the Information Commissioner's Office, the Election Commission,
the Digital, Sports, Media and Culture Committee, and the Committee on
Standards in Public Life have examined the Brexit referendum, which also was
the subject of investigations by the Cabinet Office and the National Crime
5
Agency.
4

See, e.g., ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (Mar.

2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBQ8-DU5W]
[hereinafter MUELLER REPORT] (redacted); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS i (Jan. 2017),

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01 .pdf [https://perma.cc/PZA8-Q8VX];
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND

INTERFERENCE INTHE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 3 (2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/ReportVolume 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW3K-Q2NQ];
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS

1 (Comm. Print

2018), https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSCI%20ICA%20ASSESSMENT
_FINALJULY3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ3A-WDC3] (redacted); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE 1 2 (July 2018),

https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download [https://perma.cc/J96P-X9T5].
5CABINET

OFFICE,

PROTECTING

THE

DEBATE:

INTIMIDATION,

INFLUENCE

AND

INFORMATION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 10, 20-21 (May 2019), https://assets.publishing

.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/799873/Pr
otecting-the -Debate -Government-Response-2019.05.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2L9W5GV] [hereinafter PROTECTING THE DEBATE]; DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT
COMM., DISINFORMATION AND "FAKE NEWS": FINAL REPORT, 2017 2019, HC 1791, In 148

92 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/
1791 .pdf [https://perma.cc/3ADC-N6SY] [hereinafter DCMS REPORT]; INFO. COMM'R'S
OFFICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A
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The two countries have focused their efforts somewhat differently. The
United States has focused mainly on foreign interference, while the United
Kingdom has looked more at data breaches, micro-targeted advertising, and
campaign funding improprieties. 6 But their work reveals the same thing:
changes in how paid and unpaid communications are purchased, targeted, and
shared online have created an unprecedented ability for outside actors to
influence domestic politics in ways our election rules did not fully anticipate
7
and have not effectively responded to.
In the United States, the report released in May 2019 by Special Counsel
Robert Mueller (the Mueller Report) details how Russian-affiliated actors
engaged in an extensive online campaign to influence the 2016 presidential
election. 8 In the months before the election, this campaign was supported by a
budget of more than $1,250,000 per month and included stealing online
identities and information, training foreign actors to create and disseminate
inflammatory messages about socially divisive issues, and using interconnected
REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 7 (Nov. 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/22

60271/investigation -into -the-use -of -data- analytics -in -political -campaigns -final-2018
1105.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3NG-YERQ]; THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, THE 2016 EU
REFERENDUM: REPORT ON THE JUNE 2016 REFERENDUM ON THE UK's MEMBERSHIP OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 5 (Sept. 2016), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/
default/files/pdf file/2016-EU-referendum-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU8M-N63V]
[hereinafter 2016 EU REFERENDUM]; Investigation into Payments Made to Better for the
Country and Leave.EU, ELECTORAL COMM'N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
who -we -are -and -what-we -do/our- enforcement- work/investigations/investigation -pay
ments -made -better-country-and- leaveeu [https://perma.cc/4DUE-NYJP] (last updated
Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Investigation into Payments]; Public Statement on NCA
Investigation into Suspected EU Referendum Offenses, NAT'L CRIME AGENCY (Sept. 24,

2019), https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/public-statement-on-nca-investigationinto -suspected-eu-referendum-offences [https://perma.cc/C6NF-UJHB] (discussing the
findings of the NCA's investigation).
6 Compare MUELLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 3, with INFO. COMM'R'S OFFICE,

supra note 5, at 7.
7 For a discussion of the 2016 presidential election and subsequent reform proposals
in the United States, see generally STANFORD CYBER POLICY CTR., SECURING AMERICAN
ELECTIONS: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

2020 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEYOND (Michael McFaul ed., 2019); DCMS

REPORT, supra note 5,
240-49 (discussing findings related to Kremlin-aligned media
messaging in the United Kingdom).
8According to an indictment filed February 16, 2018 by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller, Russian intelligence worked through a Russian corporation the Internet Research
Agency (IRA) to engage in online "information warfare against the United States."
Indictment (10)(c), United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). The IRA employed hundreds of people to pose as Americans and
comment on social media about U.S. politics. Id. In (10)(a), 32 34. The IRA also engaged
in data analytics to target Americans with political messages, and to create and spread
"distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general" in the lead-up to the
2016 presidential election. Id. (10)(e). The foreign origin of these activities was masked,
both online and in the underlying financial transactions. Id. 58.
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and often automated networks to spread those messages to targeted audiences
across social media platforms. 9 There appears to have been less overt
interference in the United Kingdom, but investigations since the Brexit vote
have disclosed the prevalence and coordinated distribution of Kremlin-aligned
media messaging online, 10 a "Brexit Botnet" active during the referendum
campaign, 11 misleading and inflammatory online advertising campaigns
targeted to select audiences, 12 and concerns that existing law enabled foreign
13
sources to fund certain online campaign activities.
These events revealed just how ill-equipped existing campaign laws are to
deal with this type of activity. Political advertising has been migrating online
for decades, but the regulatory systems in both the United States and United
Kingdom lag well behind.14 The problems in each country are similar. Online
election communications are subject to few or no transparency requirements,
existing reporting rules make it difficult to trace online ads to their underlying
funding source, expenditure thresholds triggering regulation do not capture
either the low cost of online advertising or the organic way information travels
online, microtargeted online advertising diminishes the effectiveness of both
regulations and "counter-speech" responses, and rules intended to limit foreign
influence in domestic elections are riddled with gaps and unresolved definitional
issues.
Understanding how the United States and United Kingdom can learn from
each other's efforts to fix these problems requires first understanding the basic
rules currently in place in each country. The following Part provides this, by
explaining the foundations of the U.S. and U.K. campaign finance and political
party funding laws.
III. FOUNDATIONS
A. CampaignFinance Law in the United States
The backbone of the United States campaign finance system is the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended in 1974 in the wake of the
Watergate scandal. 15 Congress intended the new law to govern virtually all
9

10

1d.

11 (b), 32-41.

DCMS REPORT, supra note 5,
240-49.
" Marco T. Bastos & Dan Mercea, The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated
Hyperpartisan
News, 37 Soc. ScI. COMPUTER REV. 38, 38 (2019).
12
DCMS REPORT, supra note 5,
218 21.

131Id.
31 40.
14
See id. 11 52.
15
Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101 30146 (2012 & Supp. IV
2017); see ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGN FINANCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 10

(2016). Watergate revealed loopholes in campaign finance rules that had allowed candidate
campaign committees to collect large and often undisclosed donations, some of which came
from foreign sources and many of which were routed through intermediaries to mask their
true origins. See id. at 10 14.
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aspects of how campaigns for federal office are regulated.1 6 It imposed
contribution and expenditure limits on candidates, political parties, and thirdparty campaigners, 1 7 bolstered regulatory reporting requirements, tightened
rules against the solicitation and use of foreign funds, and created a federal
regulatory body-the Federal Elections Commission (FEC)-to administer the
new rules.1 8 The law was immediately challenged in court. 1 9 The main argument
made by the challengers was that virtually all the new rules infringed on political
20
speech protected by the First Amendment.
The resulting Supreme Court decision, Buckley v. Valeo, remains the
constitutional cornerstone of campaign finance regulation in the United States.
To understand Buckley, it is useful to keep in mind three things: (1) the
difference between contributions (money given to others to spend) and
expenditures (money an individual or group spends itself); (2) the difference
between candidates and political parties on the one hand, and third-party
campaigners (groups other than candidates or political parties) on the other; and
(3) the difference between what came to be known as "express advocacy"
(which directly calls for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office)
and "issue advocacy" (which does not).21 The Buckley Court treated each of
these differences as important, and the constitutionality of a given rule today
often hinges on how these categories are defined.
Buckley is a complex opinion. The Court first addressed the difference
between contributions and expenditures. 22 It viewed contribution limits as only
indirectly restricting speech. 23 While such limits restrict the amount of money a
16

In the United States, Congress has full authority to legislate in relation to elections

for federal offices and limited authority to regulate in relation to elections for state offices.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-470, THE
SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

3 11 (2001),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230112.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7G2-ADJ3]. This Article
addresses only federal law, but decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the First
Amendment limit both federal and state laws and regulations. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
see, e.g.,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
17
Federal Election Campaign Act § 30116. The term "third-party campaigners" is used
in both the United States and the United Kingdom to refer to groups (such as interest or
pressure groups) other than political parties and candidates. See generallyAndrew C. Geddis,
Confronting the "Problem" of Third Party Expenditures in United Kingdom Election Law,

27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 103, 107 (2001) (examining how U.K. legislation regulates "third
party" expenditures on public messages).
18

19
20

Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30104, 30106, 30121.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
1d. at 11. See generally Brief of the Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 441595, at *29.
21 Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30101(2), (8) (9), (16) (17); see Buckley, 424
U.S. at 42-44; Frank Askin, Issue Advocacy, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www
.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/996/issue -advocacy [https://perma.cc/KS27-25XF]
(defining "issue advocacy").
22
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 23.
23
1d. at 20-21.
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donor can give to political parties, candidates, and third-party groups, they do
not directly restrict the donor's speech itself.24 As such, contribution limits need
not be subject to the most robust judicial scrutiny and should be upheld as long
as they are "closely drawn" to achieve a "sufficiently important interest. '25 The
Court accepted that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was
such an interest, and that contribution limits were sufficiently related to that
interest. 26 So the contribution limits imposed by FECA survived this relatively
27
relaxed level of review.
The Court viewed expenditure limits differently. Unlike contributions
limits, the Buckley Court saw expenditure limits as directly limiting the ability
of a speaker to communicate his or her own ideas. 2 8 Limits on expenditures,
therefore, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and any regulation of them needs
to be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling interest. 29 The expenditure limits
in FECA failed this test. 30 The government had defended the law's
comprehensive expenditure limits as necessary to promote political equality and
to reduce the overall amount of money spent in political campaigns. 31 The Court
found both of these reasons constitutionally insufficient. 32 Limiting the speech
of some in order to enhance that of others was "wholly foreign" to the First
Amendment, the Court said, and it was not up to Congress to determine whether
the amount of money spent on political speech was wasteful or excessive. 33 The
Court also held that the anti-corruption interest, while compelling, could not
justify expenditure limits: as long as political parties and candidates were
spending money they had raised in compliance with the contribution limits,
expenditure limits served no additional anti-corruption purpose. 34 Third-party
spending likewise posed no risk of quid pro quo corruption, the Court found, as
long as done independently of candidates and parties. 35 All of FECA's
24

1d. at 21.

25

Id. at 25.
1d. at27 29.
27
Id. at 143-44. Buckley itself was somewhat opaque about the exact standard of review
26

it was applying to contributions limits, which has been clarified by subsequent decisions. See
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) ("Precision about the relative
rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per
curiam opinion.").
28
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 21.
29
See id. at 44 45. The "exacting" or strict scrutiny applied by the Court in Buckley
requires the regulation to be "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling" interest. See First
Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (internal citations omitted); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963).
30
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 59.
31 Id. at 48-49, 57.
32

1d.

33

Id. For a comparative treatment of the concept of equality in U.S. campaign finance
law, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign
FinanceLaw: A Trans-BorderComparison,5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381 (2011).
34

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-48, 53, 55.

35 See id. at 45.
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expenditure limits therefore were deemed unconstitutional infringements on
36
political speech and struck down.
The Court did uphold FECA's transparency rules. 3 7 The law included two
types of transparency requirements. Disclosure rules requiring candidates,
political parties, and some groups to publicly disclose most of their
contributions and expenditures through mandatory reporting to the FEC, 38 and
disclaimer rules (called "imprint" rules in the United Kingdom) requiring
certain spenders to identify on the face of a communication who had authorized
and paid for it. 39 These transparency regulations, the Buckley Court held, only
indirectly affected speech. 40 Like contribution limits, they therefore would be
subject to less rigorous judicial scrutiny and were sufficiently supported by both
the interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof, and the interest
41
in avoiding circumvention of the contribution limits the Court had just upheld.
The Court's decision upholding disclosure and disclaimer requirements
included an important caveat, however, involving the second and third
distinctions set out above: the difference between candidates and political
parties, and third-party campaigners; and the difference between express and
issue advocacy. Under FECA, candidates and political parties are by definition
entities whose primary purpose is to influence federal elections. 4 2 The Buckley
Court therefore saw no difficultly in requiring them to regularly report their
contributions and expenditures to the FEC. But third-party campaigners engage
in many different types of activities, only some of which will influence federal
elections. 43 The Court therefore insisted that any scheme regulating the
independent activity of third-party groups distinguish between "express
advocacy" to influence federal elections and "issue advocacy" which the Court
saw as the type of everyday advocacy around public policy issues that citizens
should be able to engage in without becoming entangled in a complex regulatory

36

1d. at58 59.
Id. at 84.
38
Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (Supp. IV 2017).
39
See Press Release, Cabinet Office & Kevin Foster MP, Government Safeguards UK
Elections (May 5, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-safeguards-ukelections [https://perma.cc/24YH-NYYW] ("Candidates, political parties and non-party
campaigners will also be required to brand or 'imprint' their digital election materials, so the
public is clear who is targeting them."); Federal Election Campaign Act § 30120(a). For a
discussion of disclosure and disclaimer rules, see R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
37

IF10758, ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING:

DISCLAIMERS AND POLICY ISSUES

(2019),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10758.pdf [https://perma.cc/W66X-M2UB]. The term
"disclaimer" appears to have been coined because of the requirement imposed by some of
these rules that the communication clearly state that it is has not been endorsed by a
candidate. See id.
40
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.
41
1d. at 66-68.
42 See Federal Election Campaign Act §§ 30101(2), (16).
43
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 68.
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regime. 44 Moreover, in order to avoid "chilling" pure issue advocacy, the
45
distinction between these two types of speech had to be clearly delineated.
The Court acknowledged that creating a bright-line test of this sort would
be challenging, but went ahead and did so anyway. In a footnote, it limited the
relevant provisions of the law to communications including what came to be
known as the "magic words." 4 6 Under this test, only communications including
words such as "vote for," "vote against," "defeat," or "reject" could be
regulated.4 7 Consequently, under Buckley, third-party advocacy meeting the
magic words test was subject to disclaimer and disclosure rules, but that which
did not was not.4 8 As discussed below, subsequent legislation and court
decisions have tweaked this dividing line, but its fundamental importance
continues to drive U.S. law.
The practical effect of Buckley was to create a campaign finance regulatory
49
system that no one intentionally designed and very few people actually like.
A law calibrated to restrict both the ability to raise money (through contribution
limits) and the need for it (through expenditure limits) became a system in which
candidates have an escalating need for money but a tightly restricted ability to
access it. Later decisions further held that while all money raised by candidates
and political parties was subject to contribution limits, third-party "expenditureonly" groups eschewing express advocacy could raise money in unlimited and
often undisclosed amounts. 50 This had the predictable effect of channeling
money away from candidates and political parties, and toward less publicly
accountable third-party groups. 51 It doing so, it also created a system in which
much election-related activity operates outside the federal regulatory scheme.

44
45

46

See id. at 80.
Id. at 39 51.

1d.at 44 n.52; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310,439

40 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 126
27 (2003).
47
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
48 See, e.g., Citizens United, 58 U.S. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., concurring); McConnell,

540 U.S.
at 126.
49

See Daniel P. Tokaji, Campaign Finance Regulation in North America: An
InstitutionalPerspective, 17 ELECTION L.J. 188, 190 94 (2018); see also Richard L. Hasen,
Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 3541 (2004).
50
"Expenditure -only" groups are third-party campaign groups that spend money but do
not make contributions to candidates, political parties, or other groups that do make such
donations. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 694 96 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
51 In the 2016 U.S. election cycle, outside groups spent nearly $1.4 billon, surpassing
the spending of both major parties (whose combined spending totaled only $290 million).
Young Mie Kim et al., The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive Issue
Campaigns on Facebook, 35 POL. CoMM. 515, 518 (2018).
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B. PoliticalParty Funding and CampaignFinance Law in the United
Kingdom
Campaign finance regulation in the United Kingdom is in some ways the
diametric opposite of that in the United States. Rather than control the
availability of funds through limits on contributions to candidates and political
parties, the U.K. system controls the need for them by restricting expenditures
through spending limits and a ban on expensive broadcast advertising. It also
tightly restricts third-party spending and imposes similar transparency rules on
third-party campaigners as it does on candidates and political parties. This is
very different than the United States system, which strictly limits contributions
to candidates, political parties, and some third-party groups; restricts candidate
and political party financing more tightly than that of third-party campaigners;
and is constitutionally prohibited from limiting expenditures at all.
Three pieces of primary legislation structure the U.K. system. The
Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA) governs constituency-level
spending; the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA)
governs national spending; and the Communications Act 2003 regulates
political communications on broadcast television and radio. 52 Most of the
restrictions imposed under these statutes apply only during the "regulated
period," which is set by the U.K. Electoral Commission (EC) and usually covers
a year prior to a general election or four months prior to a referendum or other
53
election.
The RPA is the oldest of these laws, and many of its provisions have been
in place in some form for decades. It focuses on the spending that happens for
or against individual candidates within constituency districts. 54 The law sets a
52

See Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2 §§ 71A, 73 (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]; Political
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2000/4 /contents [https ://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC]; Communications Act 2003, c.
21 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents [https://perma.cc/2REDWWYZ].
53 THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF PARTY CAMPAIGN SPENDING 5 (2016),
https://www.electoralcommission. org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf-file/to -campaign- spend
-rp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KSN-W9GD] [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF PARTY CAMPAIGN
SPENDING]. Constituency spending is, generally speaking, spending for or against a

particular candidate in a particular district. See id. at 4. National level spending is spending
for or against a political party or national referendum. See id. The regulated period for a
general election can apply retroactively after an election is called. Non-Party Campaigners:
Where to Start, ELECTORAL COMM'N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/non-partycampaigners -where -start/does- your-campaign-activity-meet-purpose -test/purpose -testregulated -period -early-uk-parliamentary- general -election [https://perma.cc/YNY6-2FN3]
(last updated Sept. 23, 2019).
54
See Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, §§ 71A 90D (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]. Members
of the Westminster Parliament (the legislative body of the United Kingdom) are elected by
a first-past-the -post system in single member constituency districts. Id. c. 2, sch. 1. Separate
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base level of permitted spending that is the same for all candidates in all districts,
with additional spending permitted on a per-elector basis, allowing candidates
in more heavily populated districts to spend more. 55 It also tightly restricts third56
party spending for or against specific constituency-level candidates.
When the RPA was enacted, its focus on constituency-level spending made
sense. Historically, the national expenditures of the two main political parties
were small compared to the spending done by candidates in individual
districts. 57 But by the 1990s, political parties had grown in importance and
spending had shifted away from constituency districts and to the national, partydriven campaigns. Advocates of reform began arguing that the RPA's focus
solely on constituency-level spending did not adequately address the reality of
how U.K. campaigns were funded. 58 There also was concern about the influence
on elected officials of large and undisclosed donations, and what was
increasingly seen as excessive spending on campaigns. 59 PPERA responded to
those concerns.
PPERA grew out of the Standing Committee on Standards in Public Life
(the Neill Committee), which Parliament had tasked with recommending
changes to the United Kingdom's campaign finance laws. 60 The Neill
Committee made more than 100 recommendations, most of which were adopted
by Parliament in PPERA. 61 Despite the hopes of some reform advocates, these
changes did not include imposing caps on contributions. Political contributions
in the United Kingdom remain uncapped, and the major parties are funded by
62
membership dues plus a relatively small number of very large donations.

elections are held to elect the U.K. members of the European Parliament, and the members
of the national parliaments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. See Guide to May 2016
Elections in Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35813119 [https://perma.cc/KDW7-X4QY].
55 Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, § 76(2) (UK), http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE]. Constituency districts
in the United Kingdom vary in population size. See FEARGAL McGUINNESS, HOUSE OF
COMMONS LIBRARY, SIZES OF CONSTITUENCY ELECTORATES 7 22 (2011).
56
Jacob Eisler, Formalismand Realism in Campaign FinanceLaw, 78 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
257, 257 58 (2019).
57
NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, 10.16, at 114.
58
See Geddis, supra note 17, at 110 15.
59
NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, 10.2, at 110.
60
Terms of Reference, COMMITTEE STANDARDS PUB. LIFE, https://www.gov.uk/
government/organisations/the -committee -on- standards -in-public -life/about/terms -ofreference [https://perma.cc/M2LK-C2KN]; see also 12 Nov. 1997, Parl Deb HC (1997)
col. 899 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99798/cmhansrd/vo971112/
debtext/71112-20.htm#71112-20_sbhd0 [https://perma.cc/2S5M-F69F].
61
NEILL REPORT, supra note 2,
1 100, at 4 14 (outlining the recommendations
offered by the committee).
62 The Committee tried again in 2011 after all three main British political parties made
a commitment in principle to support contribution caps, but was unable to come up with a
proposal all parties would agree to. COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, POLITICAL PARTY
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PPERA did, however, require for the first time that contributions exceeding
64
£5000 (later raised to £750063) be publicly disclosed.
PPERA also imposed nationwide expenditure limits on political parties and
third-party campaigners (the RPA continues to govern the expenditure limits
imposed on individual candidates and third-party constituency-level
spending). 65 Different limits apply to different spenders in different elections.
Calculating the applicable limit turns on things like when in the Parliamentary
cycle the spending occurs, how many constituency districts are being contested,
and in which part of the United Kingdom the spending takes place. 66 Political
parties have higher limits than third-party campaigners, and also have separate
limits for general party advocacy versus candidate-specific advocacy. 67 The
applicable limits for referendums (like the Brexit vote) are set by the EC. 6 8 As
in the United States, to avoid circumvention of these limits, coordinated
spending is treated differently. Spending done in coordination with a political
party (or "lead campaign group" in a referendum) is counted toward the
spending cap of the party or lead group. 69 If other registered campaigners
coordinate with each other, their spending is considered that of one group, and
70
their combined total must stay within the applicable limit as such.
The third significant statute in the U.K. regulatory scheme is the
Communications Act 2003. The 2003 law updated and continued the longstanding ban in the United Kingdom prohibiting political advertising on
FINANCE: ENDING THE BIG DONOR CULTURE, 2011, Cm. 8208, at 8 9 (UK) [hereinafter
POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE].
63 STUART WILKS-HEEG & STEPHEN CRONE, FUNDING POLITICAL PARTIES IN GREAT

BRITAIN:
A PATHWAY TO REFORM 13 (2010).
64

Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 62 (UK), http://www

.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/4 1/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC].
65Id. c. 41, §§ 79, 94, schs. 9, 10.
66
Id. These limits were tied to the proportion of the vote the party received at the most
recent general election, which was the 2015 general Westminster Parliament election.
67 For example, in 2011 in a general election for the Westminster Parliament in which
all constituency districts were being contested, the spending cap on each of the political
parties was £19.5 million. POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE, supra note 62, at 30. The national
spending cap for registered third parties (interest groups intending to spend more than
£10,000 to attempt to influence an election) was just under £800,000 in England, and the
third-party limit for candidate -specific spending in the constituency districts was £500. Id. at
31 32.
68 For referendum campaigns, the EC uses a statutorily defined process to identify a
"lead campaign group" for each side of the debate. See THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, THE
DESIGNATION PROCESS 4 (Mar. 2016), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/

default/files/pdf file/Designation -process -for-the-EU-referendum.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E73H-TRXV] [hereinafter DESIGNATION PROCESS]. The lead campaign group has a
significantly higher spending limit than other registered groups. For Brexit, the lead
campaigns had a limit of £7 million while the limit for other registered campaign groups was
£700,000.
2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra note 5, at 91.
69
See DESIGNATION PROCESS, supra note 68, at 6.

70

See id.

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:3

broadcast media.71 Unlike the RPA and PPERA, this restriction is in effect at
all times, not just during the regulated election period. Under the Act,
recognized political parties contesting seats in a requisite number of
constituency districts are given free broadcast time during the lead up to an
election, but no other political ads can be legally broadcast on public or private
television or radio at any time. 72 The ban is far-reaching, and applies not only
to political party ads, but also to third-party ads "directed towards a political
end."

73

The combined effect of RPA, PPERA, and the Communications Act 2003
is a regulatory system very different from that in the United States. Those
differences are significant-the Communications Act 2003, for example, would
be plainly unconstitutional under United States law. As shown below, however,
the reform proposals being considered in each nation only rarely implicate these
differences, allowing ample room for constructive comparative work.
IV. TAXONOMY OF REFORM PROPOSALS
Regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in the United States and
United Kingdom have generated numerous proposals to more effectively
regulate online campaigning and foreign interference in domestic elections.
Some of these proposals-such as tightening data privacy rules and imposing
antitrust restraints on social media companies-do not directly engage
campaign laws and are not discussed here. Others, however, touch on
controversies central to those laws, such as how to define campaign-related
speech, how to balance personal privacy with public accountability, and how to
ensure fair elections without infringing on the freedom of expression essential
to a functioning democracy.
This Part addresses those proposals. In doing so, it organizes them into a
common taxonomy, and examines the legal rules governing each class of
proposal in each nation. Grouping the proposals into this organizational scheme
brings a systemic coherence to comparative work in this area by contextualizing
similar proposals within the specific legal rules under which they will be
evaluated. This enables more of an "apples-to-apples" evaluation of the legal
challenges each type of reform will face in each nation, allowing us to see more
clearly which proposals are worthy of additional comparative study, and which
are not.
The taxonomy classifies reform proposals according to their underlying
goals. There are four principle goals: better educating the public about digital
literacy (public education); enhancing the transparency of online campaigning
(transparency); reducing the influence of foreign interests over voters' choices

71 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, § 321 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2003/2 I/contents [https://perma.cc/2RED-WWYZ].
72
1d. §§ 319, 321, 333.
73
1d. § 321(2)(a) (c).
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(source exclusions); and excluding deceptive or otherwise harmful content from
online distribution (content exclusions). Not all reform proposals, of course, fit
neatly into this taxonomy, nor does the analysis that follows discuss every
proposal made within each category; the taxonomy is exemplary, not
comprehensive. But organizing the most common proposals this way efficiently
facilitates comparative consideration.
As shown below, these four types of reform proposals can be visualized as
a pyramid. The reforms at the base of the pyramid (public education) face few
system-specific legal challenges and therefore are the most comparable across
systems; reforms at the peak (content exclusions) face the most such challenges,
and therefore offer fewer opportunities for productive comparative analysis
(although even here there are areas in which the two nations can learn from each
other's experiences).

Ak

Transparency

Public education proposals, at the base of the pyramid, do not directly
involve campaign laws but are included because their goal is to make voters
more critical consumers of political messages they see online. In the United
States, these proposals include federal efforts such as the expansion of the State
Department's counterterrorism mission to include combating disinformation,
and efforts such as those in California, Massachusetts, and Washington to teach
digital media literacy in schools. 74 In the United Kingdom, this category
includes things like proposals to use a social media tax to fund online literacy
74 Alex Stamos et al., Combatting State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns from

State-Aligned Actors, in STANFORD CYBER POLICY CTR., supra note 7, at 44 (internal
citations omitted).
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programs, and efforts to promote awareness of the standards of professional
journalism. 75 Public education proposals like these are unlikely to face
significant legal challenges in either country and are only briefly discussed
below.
Transparency proposals aim to help voters make more informed choices by
ensuring they understand who is promoting or paying for the political messages
they see. Transparency proposals are plentiful in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, and include recommendations to require disclaimers
(imprints) on online ads, require more detailed reporting of online expenditures,
and change the type and nature of online spending disclosed to regulatory
bodies. 7 6 The laws governing transparency rules in the United States and United
Kingdom are different, and these differences mean reforms in this category will
face distinct legal challenges in each nation. Examining these proposals through
the structure provided by the taxonomy allows us to see that these legal
differences are not as relevant to the reforms being proposed as is frequently
assumed. This category therefore provides extensive opportunity for genuinely
valuable comparative consideration.
Source exclusions regulate political communications based on who is
speaking, promoting, or paying for the communication. The goal of reform
proposals in this class is to limit the influence of foreign interests on domestic
elections by precluding foreign funding of election-related communications.
Analyzing each nation's law through the taxonomy reveals that source
exclusions will face significantly different legal challenges in the United States
and United Kingdom, but that there is sufficient common ground even here to
make comparative study useful.
Content exclusions are designed to exclude or reduce harmful
communications online. What is considered "harmful" varies in these proposals,
and ranges from things already regulated if done offline (such as defamation,
harassment, fraud, or abuse) to more controversial efforts to limit the online
spread of propaganda, disinformation, and other content considered detrimental
to democratic discourse. Context exclusions, at the apex of the pyramid, will
face the most system-specific legal barriers, many of which are likely to be
insurmountable in the United States.
The remainder of this Part will discuss in detail the current rules governing
each of these categories in the United States and United Kingdom, and the legal
75

Damian Tambini, Three Ways the Government Can Supercharge Media Literacy

Policy in the UK, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. Sc. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/

medialse/2019/01/30/3 -ways -the -government- can- supercharge -media- literacy-policy
-in-the-uk [https://perma.cc/7WZG-72L2].
76
See, e.g., Advertising and Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www
fec. gov/help -candidates -and -committees/making -disbursements/advertising/ [https://
perma.cc/76WL-ESSZ] (outlining online disclosure); Campaign Finance: United
Kingdom, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/uk.php
[https://perma.cc/8GHG-FL6M] (last updated July 1, 2015) (outlining U.K. online
expenditure requirements).
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challenges reforms in each category of proposal are likely to face in each
country. In doing so, it also will identify the specific areas where further
comparative study will be most beneficial.
A. Public Education
Rather than directly regulate campaign speech, public education proposals
seek to make voters more critical consumers of the political messages they see.
This type of public education effort is unlikely to encounter significant legal
barriers in either the United States or the United Kingdom. It nonetheless is
included here because of its fundamental importance in combatting online and
foreign election interference. Effective regulation of election-related speech is
devilishly difficult, and will be so even if campaign laws are fully updated and
regulators fully engaged. Increasing awareness of the problem through public
education efforts is therefore critical.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have taken small steps in
this area. In the United States, the mission of the State Department's Global
Engagement Center has been expanded to include countering foreign
disinformation more broadly. 77 The U.S. Intelligence Community also has made
efforts to increase public awareness of the problem. The former Director of
79
National Intelligence, 78 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
8
0
the former Homeland Security Secretary, and the former Special Counsel to
the U.S. Attorney General all have made public statements warning Americans
of ongoing efforts by foreign actors to use social media platforms to inflame
political tensions and influence U.S. elections.8 1 In the United Kingdom, former

77

Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, S. 3274, 114th Cong.
(2016). This Act was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017. Compare id., with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,
Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1287, 130 Stat. 2000, 2546-48 (2016) (directing the establishment
of a Global Engagement Center to "recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state
and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts").
78 See Martin Matishak, Intelligence Heads Warn of More Aggressive Election
Meddling in 2020, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.politico.com!story/2019/01/29/
dan- coats -2020 -election -foreign- interference -1126077 [https://perma.cc/GY2K-RX4J].
79
Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian Interference in 2020
Race and Boosts CounterintelligenceOperations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com!2019/04/26/us/politics/fbi -russian- election -interference.html [https://perma
.cc/TZB4-7LPA].
80Eric Schmitt et al., In Push for 2020 Election Security, Top Official Was Warned:
Don't Tell Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/
us/politics/russia -2020 -election -trump.html [https://perma.cc/BZ6S-78KX].
81 Full Transcript of Mueller's Statement on Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com!20 19/05/29/us/politics/mueller -transcript.html [https
://perma.cc/SJS6-7C4E].
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Prime Minister Theresa May has done so as well.82 Public education efforts also
have been endorsed by most of the commissions and committees examining the
issue in the United Kingdom, including the Electoral Commission,83 the
Information Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life,8 4 and the
85
House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee.
While these efforts have varying degrees of political support, they raise few
serious legal issues in either the United States or the United Kingdom. Within
broad limits, governments in both countries are free to engage in public
information campaigns. In the United Kingdom, this type of effort would
encounter no discernable legal challenges. 8 6 In the United States, public
information campaigns are governed by the "government speech" doctrine. The
core tenet of this doctrine is that when the government itself is speaking, it is
allowed to advocate for its preferred position. So, for example, the government
can fund an anti-smoking campaign without also having to fund pro-smoking
messages. The doctrine is underdeveloped in several ways,8 7 but as long as it is
clear the government is the entity speaking, a public information campaign
designed to increase digital literacy among voters would be unlikely to
encounter significant legal challenge even in the United States. The remainder
of this Article therefore will focus on the other three classes in the taxonomy:
transparency, source exclusions, and content exclusions.
B. Transparency
Transparency is the largest and most diverse class in the taxonomy. When
considering transparency proposals and the rules governing them, it is helpful
to remember the distinction mentioned above between disclosure and disclaimer
(imprint) rules. Disclosure rules require candidates, political parties, and some
82 Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017
[https://perma.cc/S95H-WZ9P].
83 THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING: INCREASING TRANSPARENCY FOR
VOTERS In 32 34 (2018), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/
pdf file/Digital -campaigning -improving -transparency- for- voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W3FP-QFMU]
[hereinafter DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING].
84
COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, INTIMIDATION IN PUBLIC LIFE 18 (Dec. 2017),
https://assets.publishing. service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-da
ta/file/666927/6.3637 CO v6 061217_Web3.1 2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ79-MCYP].
85 The DCSM Report identifies digital literacy as a "fourth pillar" of education, along
with reading, writing, and math. DCSM REPORT, supra note 5, at 87.
86
DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83,
104 25, at 20 23. There are limits in the
United Kingdom on governmental spending to promote particular outcomes in referendums.
See generally 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra note 5, at 90.

87There are unresolved questions about how to distinguish the government's own
speech from governmental funding for the speech of others, and whether it is legally relevant
that the recipients of the message understand they are hearing a government-provided
communication. There also are tangentially related prohibitions and norms against using
federal funds to distribute propaganda directed at U.S. citizens.
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groups to report their income and expenditures to a regulatory body. Disclaimer
rules require certain communications to carry on their face information about
who authorized or paid for the communication. Disclosure rules advance
transparency by informing the public about who supports candidates for public
office and who those candidates may be indebted to if elected; disclaimer rules
advance transparency by informing the public about the source of the political
messages they are seeing. 8 8 The most prominent reform proposals in this class
involve strengthening disclosure rules by requiring more detailed reporting
about the financing of such communications, and expanding disclaimer rules to
cover more online communications.
The breadth and variety of online communications potentially covered by
disclosure and disclaimer rules is what creates the legal challenges in this
category. Any transparency rule, whether it be about disclaimers or disclosures,
must define the communications it covers. This is challenging even when
targeting traditional campaign communications, and becomes more so in the
fluid world of online social media. Relatedly, lawmakers also must decide if
online transparency rules should mirror offline rules, or if the differences
between formats warrant distinct regulatory approaches. As shown below, while
the United States and United Kingdom regulate disclosures and disclaimers
quite differently, each country struggles with these same questions.
1. Transparencyin the United States
The federal statutory law governing disclosure and disclaimer in the United
States is found in two statutes: the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA,
discussed above), and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, which
amended FECA in 2002).89 FECA requires political parties, candidates, and
certain third-party campaigners to register and file regular reports with the FEC.
Political parties and candidates running for federal office must register with the
FEC when they raise or spend over a threshold amount in connection with a
federal election. 90 Third-party campaigners must register as "political
committees" (more commonly known as political action committees or
91
"PACS") when their major purpose is to influence federal elections.
Entities required to register with the FEC (FEC-registered groups) must file
regular reports with the FEC specifying their contributions and expenditures.
These reports are filed electronically at quarterly or monthly intervals, although
88 See Ciara Torres -Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure?Revealing
Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1080
(2011); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1890 (2013).
89

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
Registering as a Candidate, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates -and-committees/registering-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/F48Q-6VQ2].
91
FEC Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. § 5595, 5596 97 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
90
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expenditures on certain types of communications must be reported within
twenty-four hours. 92 FEC-registered groups also must include disclaimers on
most of their public communications, which are defined by the FEC as any
general public political advertising, including broadcasts, newspaper and
93
magazine ads, and internet ads "placed for a fee" on another person's website.
Consequently, groups that register with the FEC are by definition subject to
extensive transparency rules. Their contributions and expenditures are disclosed
in regular public reports, and most of their communications include disclaimers
94
stating who authorized and paid for the communication.
But not all groups that make campaign-related communications are required
to register as political parties or committees with the FEC and therefore are not
subject to these regular disclosure and disclaimer rules. 95 The most significant
of these groups are "social welfare" groups. 96 Social welfare groups are a
category defined by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS", the U.S. federal tax
agency) for taxation purposes. 97 They often are referred to by the IRS code
provision that defines them: 501(c)(4). Under the applicable statute, to qualify
for 501(c)(4) status, an organization must not be organized for profit and must
be operated "exclusively" to promote the social welfare. 98 Regulations
promulgated under the statute, however, permit social welfare groups to engage
in political activity as long such efforts do not constitute their "primary"
99
activity.
This has permitted extensive use of 501(c)(4) status by politically active
groups wishing to avoid FEC regulation. Because they are not defined as
political committees for purposes of federal campaign law, they are not subject

92 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b) (2015); Filing Frequency by Type of Filer, FED. ELECTION

COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/dates-and-deadlines/
filing -frequency-type -filer/ [https://perma.cc/X3JU-5WUT]. The 24-hour reporting
requirement applies to expenditures in excess of $10,000 on "electioneering
communications" as defined in BCRA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88.
9352 U.S.C. § 30101(22) (Supp. IV 2017); 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (1996). This provision
is discussed in greater detail below.
94

Public Communications, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/press/

resources journalists/public -communications [https://perma.cc/X9VY-R5VZ].
95 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (defining a political committee); see also id. § 30120
(requiring political committees to disclose certain funding and authorization sources for
certain public communications).
96
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)(a)(2)(i) (2019) (describing the nature of a "social
welfare" organization as one being "primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people").
97 See id. § 1.50 1(c)(4)(a)(1) (noting a disclosure and disclaimer exemption for civic
organizations operating "exclusively for the promotion of social welfare").
981d.; ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40183,

501 (c)(4)s AND
3 (2013).
99

LUNDER

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS

& WHITAKER, supra note 98, at 3.
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to FECA's regularized disclosure and disclaimer rules. 100 Instead, their political
communications are regulated by separate transparency rules developed by the
FEC for unregistered groups that nonetheless engage in some election-related
communications.1 01 Drawing on the distinction made by the Supreme Court in
Buckley, these groups need only report expenditures for express advocacy and
contributions "earmarked" for that advocacy. 102 A communication is express
advocacy for these purposes when it includes the Buckley magic words or the
functional equivalent thereof.10 3 A contribution is earmarked when it is
designated by the donor as given to fund a particular communication.10 4 FEC
disclaimer rules developed for these groups track this paradigm, and apply only
to those of their public communications that expressly advocate for the election
10 5
or defeat of a candidate for federal office.
The result of all this is that under FECA, only FEC-registered groups are
subject to regular disclosure and disclaimer requirements, while non-FEC
registered groups such as 501(c)(4)s can engage in significant political
communications while avoiding most disclosure and disclaimer rules. This
creates an obvious transparency gap. Entities like social welfare groups can
avoid regular FEC regulation and reporting requirements by limiting their
election-related advocacy to less than fifty percent of their activity, while also
avoiding targeted regulation by avoiding words of express advocacy even in
communications intended to influence federal elections.
BCRA attempted to partially close this gap by bringing an additional
category of speech into the U.S. disclosure and disclaimer regime. As required
by Buckley, BCRA uses a bright-line test to define the category of speech being
regulated. BCRA defines the communications it regulates-"electioneering
communications"-as any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that
refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, is publicly distributed
thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election, and is
targeted to the relevant electorate.10 6 Under BCRA, electioneering
communications, like express advocacy and the public communications of FECregistered groups, must carry disclaimers identifying who is responsible and
paying for the communication.10 7 Entities who spend $10,000 or more a year
10 0

See id.
101Id. at 11. See generally Torres -Spelliscy, supra note 88 (discussing the history of
campaign finance disclosure law and two exemptions to those disclosure laws).
102 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 23, 44 (1976).
103 This test, which extends slightly beyond the "magic words" test of Buckley, was
developed by the Supreme Court in 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,
453 (2007). Wisconsin Right to Life imposed a narrowing construction on the definition of
electioneering communications, holding that the provision was unconstitutional unless read
to apply only to expenditures that could not "reasonably be viewed" as anything other than
urging the support or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Id. at 474.
104 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (2019).
105 Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
10652 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (Supp. IV 2017).
10 7

ld. § 30104(f)(1) (2).
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producing or placing electioneering communications also must file a disclosure
statement with the FEC identifying the names and addresses of those who have
1 08
contributed more than $1000 to fund its communications.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld these transparency provisions in Citizens
United v. FEC.10 9 Decided in 2010, Citizens United is better known for striking
down a ban on the use of corporate general revenue funds to fund a corporation's
independent expenditures. 110 But the case also addressed the constitutionality
of disclosure and disclaimer requirements as applied by BCRA to electioneering
communications.1 11 The case is important for U.S. transparency law, because
the core question presented was whether transparency regulations could be
applied to political communications that did not constitute express advocacy
1 12
under Buckley and its progeny.
By an 8-1 vote, the Court upheld the transparency requirements. 11 3 In doing
so, it found that disclosure and disclaimer rules, like campaign contributions,
are not direct prohibitions on speech and therefore need only be supported by a
substantial (rather than compelling) interest.1 1 4 The Court further held that
"shedding the light of publicity"1 1 5 on who is financing political speech is such
an interest, as is providing the electorate with information sufficient to ensure
that voters are fully informed about who is speaking.11 6 This type of
information, the Court said, "enables the electorate to make informed decisions
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages." 17 Importantly, the
Court was clear that these transparency requirements can be imposed even when
the communication being regulated does not constitute express advocacy and
1 18
the group speaking is not otherwise regulated by the FEC.
Assuming appropriate exceptions are available to protect the privacy of
smaller donors and to allow for as-applied challenges for entities for whom
108 Citizens United v. FEC and the Future of FederalCampaign FinanceReform, LIBR.
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizens -united.php [https://perma.cc/2EV7MXDU] (last updated Aug. 16, 2019).
109 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 72 (2010).
110 Discussed infra Part IV.C. 1.
111
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 72.
112
1d. at 318 19.
113

1d. at 370 72.
1d. at 366 67.
115
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976)).
116 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 71.
117
1d. at 371. An earlier decision, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995), had cast doubt on this informational interest, as applied to handmade leaflets
distributed by an individual at a local meeting. The cost of preparing and distributing the
leaflets at issue in McIntyre was negligible, and would have fallen well below the applicable
reporting thresholds upheld in Buckley and subsequent cases. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337
(noting that the defendant had "composed and printed [the leaflets] on her home computer
and had paid a professional printer to make additional copies").
114

118 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
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disclosure poses a risk of serious harassment (limitations imposed by the Court
in earlier cases),11 9 the U.S. Supreme Court has therefore allowed disclosure
and disclaimer requirements to attach to a wide array of political
communications.1 20 This may not continue: the composition of the Supreme
Court is changing rapidly, and transparency rules are being challenged across
the United States.1 21 But at least under existing law, disclosure and disclaimer
requirements could be applied to many more online communications than they
currently are.
This result has been stymied, however, by BCRA itself and by the FEC. The
text of BCRA only applies to "broadcast" communications, and the FEC has
interpreted the statute as not applying to other media, including newspapers,
magazines, telephones, and the internet.1 22 This means the only statutory
transparency requirements currently applicable to online communications are
the more limited provisions found in FECA, which, as discussed above, only
apply to the public communications of FEC-registered groups and the express
advocacy of groups not otherwise regulated by the FEC. Neither the FEC nor
Congress has as of yet expanded FECA's coverage to include the broader
category of electioneering communications as defined in BCRA. This means
that online "issue ads" (ads not including words of express advocacy) run by
groups not regulated by the FEC as political parties, candidates, or political
committees are not subject to any disclosure or disclaimer laws.
Additionally, the FEC also has been slow to extend even the limited
1 23
disclosure and disclaimer required by FECA to online communications.
Instead, it has created a situation in which even ads that would require
disclaimers if appearing offline (because they are the public communications of
FEC-registered groups or the express advocacy of other groups) are not always
required to carry disclaimers when distributed online. The FEC has
119

See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 560 62 (2012) (describing the
Supreme Court's finding that the Constitution required a harassment exception to disclosure
requirements).
120 See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176, 193 (D.D.C.
2016), affd, 137 S. Ct. 1204 (2017) (summary affirmance upholding the constitutionality of
FECA large donor disclosure rules to issue -only i.e., not express advocacy electioneering
communications paid for by a social welfare group).
121 See Hasen, supra note 119, at 561 62 (illustrating what the Supreme Court in its
changing composition has recently required to grant an as-applied exception to otherwise
permissible disclosure requirements).
122BCRA defines "electioneering communications" as any "broadcast, cable and
satellite communications." FED. ELECTION COMM'N, ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS
BROCHURE 6 (2005), https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ec-brochure.pdf [https
://perma.cc/S54T-P3WR].
123
See Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.corn: How the FEC's Failure to
Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign FinanceLaw, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1709
n.4 (2009) ("Whatever the reason, the FEC has, over the last several years, shown a
consistent desire to not regulate the internet.").
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accomplished this through a series of regulatory decisions and advisory
opinions.1 24 One of the first such decisions came in 2002, when the FEC
determined that paid text message ads were exempt from an otherwise
1 25
applicable disclaimer requirement under a "small-items" exception
developed for things like campaign buttons and bumper stickers.1 26 Two years
later, the FEC expanded on this idea by arguing in a lawsuit that it had
administrative discretion to categorically exclude all digital communications
from FECA's disclaimer rules. 127 When that position was rejected in court, the
FEC decided that FECA disclaimers would only be required on digital ads
"placed for a fee" on the "website" of another.1 28 This meant that the
requirement did not apply to communications distributed for free online,
regardless of the cost of producing the content involved. It also meant the
requirement did not extend to non-web-based platforms, such as mobile apps.
That requirement was then even further diluted in 2011, when the FEC
deadlocked on whether paid ads on Facebook required disclaimers. 129 This nondecision allowed Facebook to host even express advocacy ads without
disclaimers until 2017, when the FEC finally issued an opinion stating that paid
advertisements on Facebook were required to carry disclaimers when
1 30
constituting express advocacy or placed by an FEC-registered group.
Only in 2018, in the wake of revelations about the 2016 election, did the
FEC slightly shift course and propose two draft regulations designed to expand
the transparency of online election-related communications.1 31 The drafts are
124

Advisory Opinions apply only to the specific circumstances presented. They offer

guidance to similarly situated entities, but do not have the certainty of law or promulgated
regulations.
GARRETT, supra note 39.
125
Fed. Election Comm'n, Advisory Opinion 2002 09 (Aug. 23, 2002).
126 11 C.F.R. § l10.11(f)(i) (2019).
127
See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) ("For
the [FEC] to exercise [such] discretion ... [it] would require more explicit instruction from

Congress.").
12 8

Zainab Smith, Public Hearingon Internet Disclaimers,FED. ELECTION COMMISSION

(July 18, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/
[https://perma.cc/G4W2-AS SE].
129
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, I Approved This Facebook Message But You
Don't Know That, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/iapproved-this-facebook-message-but-you-dont-know-that [https://perma.cc/MG2Z-WY
QN] ("[T]he six-person FEC couldn't muster the four votes needed to issue an opinion, with
three commissioners saying only limited disclosure was required and three saying the ads
needed no disclosure at all, because it would be 'impracticable' for political ads on Facebook
to contain more text than other ads.").
130A 2018 study by ProPublica indicated this rule was rarely followed and
noncompliance was rarely punished. See id.(discovering that fewer than 40 of 300 Facebook
ads had the FEC-required disclaimers).
131 Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of "Public Communication," 83
Fed. Reg. 12,864 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100). The Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking requires all commenters to provide their name, city, and state. Id.
at 12,864. Presumably, the Commission wants to know who is attempting to influence its
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substantially similar. 132 Both would expand online disclaimer requirements

beyond "websites" to include paid placements on any digital platform, including
Facebook, Google, Twitter, Pinterest, and YouTube, and mobile apps; and both
would attach disclosure requirements to digital communications required to
133
carry disclaimers.
If adopted, either of these rules would bring more transparency to paid
online political communications in the United States. But both drafts are limited
in that they only extend to online ads the current disclaimer rules applicable
under FECA, not the broader rules enacted in BCRA.1 34 So, the new online
disclaimer requirements would apply only to the public communications of
FEC-registered groups and the express advocacy of other groups, meaning
entities like social welfare groups will continue to be able to run even paid online
advertisements without disclaimers as long as they avoid words of express
advocacy. 1 3 5 The drafts are similarly limited on the disclosure side. Both drafts
require disclosure of the identity of the entity paying for the ad, but continue the
requirement that only earmarked contributions to that entity need be
disclosed.1 36 So, while FEC-regulated groups would continue to have to
disclose virtually all of their contributors,1 37 the draft rules would allow other
groups to run even paid express advertisements without disclosing their
underlying funders unless the funder specifically designates his or her donation
as for a particular express ad.
An additional limitation of the draft rules is the continued application of the
1 38
transparency rules only to online communications "placed for a fee" online.
Restricting online transparency rules to paid placements means the only
expenses counting toward the threshold-triggering regulation are those paid to
the platform hosting the ad. Since online advertising is significantly less
expensive than its offline counterparts, this means increasing numbers of even
paid placements could fall below the reporting threshold.1 39 More significantly,
decisions, so it can be fully informed about the person or group who is speaking and better
evaluate the arguments presented.
132 The most significant difference between the proposals is their alternative compliance
standards for communications where full disclosure is considered impossible or impractical.
Id.at 12,879.
1331d. at 12,869.
134
See id. at 12,866.
135 Id.

136 Id.
137

Political Committees regulated by the FEC must disclose to the FEC the names of all

donors contributing more than $200. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2017).

138 Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of "Public Communication," 83

Fed.13Reg.
at 12,868.
9
DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83, at
HODGSON OF ASTLEY ABBOTTS

CBE,

1 10, 62 66 (2018); see also THE LORD

THIRD-PARTY ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

GETTING

THE BALANCE RIGHT: REvIEw OF THE OPERATION OF THE THIRD PARTY CAMPAIGNING RULES

2016, Cm. 9205, at 74 (UK); Brendan Fischer, Campaign
Finance Law in the 21st Century, in CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., EXAMINING FOREIGN
AT THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION,
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it means that extensive costs incurred in producing political communicationslike the millions of dollars spent to train and employ workers at the St.
Petersburg troll factory1 40 -do not count toward the applicable threshold. Other
reform proposals being considered in the United States, such as the DISCLOSE
Act and the Honest Ads Act, also hew to this more conservative path. 141
Again, this restrictive approach is not required by current U.S. law. As
discussed above, Citizens United explicitly upheld the disclaimer requirements
BCRA imposed on electioneering communications (broadcast communications
that run in relevant time period and clearly identify a candidate for federal
office) even when those communications do not constitute express advocacy. 142

BCRA, unlike FECA, also uses cost of production-not cost of placement-as
the triggering threshold for its transparency measures. 1 43 So increasing
transparency by extending BCRA's definition of "broadcast communications"
to include online communications should be within the constitutional
parameters set by the Supreme Court in Citizens United. Lower federal court
decisions recognize this. A federal district court recently struck down an attempt
by the FEC to restrict BCRA's transparency requirements to paid placements
1 44
and exempt social welfare organizations from BCRA's rules entirely.
Additionally, the FEC's earmarking rule, currently used by the FEC to restrict
the reach of FECA's disclosure requirements, has been struck down by a district
INTERFERENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 16 (2018). See generally 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra
note 5.
140 This "troll factory" refers to the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg, an
agency who many commentators argue influenced the outcome of the UK-EU referendum.
Clare Llewellyn et al., For Whom the Bell Trolls: Shifting Troll Behaviour in the Twitter
Brexit Debate, 57 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1148, 1148 (2019).
141 The Honest Ads Act expands disclosure and disclaimer rules to capture more online
election communications but does not extend transparency rules to unpaid placements.
H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. (2017). For a discussion of this history, see Ellen P. Goodman &
Lyndsey Wajert, The Honest Ads Act Won't End Social Media Disinformation, But It's a
Start 1 (Nov. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery
.cfm/SSRNID306445 lcode333377.pdf?abstractid=3064451 &mirid= 1 [https://perma
.cc/H8BM-P6FH]. A separate piece of legislation, the DISCLOSE Act, prohibits domestic
corporations with significant foreign control, ownership, or direction from spending money
in elections. S. 1585, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017).
142 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 369 72 (2010).
143 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(a)(2) (2015); How to Report Electioneering Communications,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/otherfilers/electioneering-communications/ [https://perma.cc/XF69-BYMM]; Smith, supra note
128.
144
Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 128 (D.D.C. 2004). The court
held the statute clearly intended the rules to apply to unpaid placements as long as the overall
expenditure involved in distributing the advertisement exceeded $10,000. Id. at 129. The
court also struck down the FEC's categorical exclusion of any electioneering
communications placed by IRS regulated entities. Id. at 126 27; see also Del. Strong
Families v. Att'y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[I]t is the conduct of
an organization, rather than an organization's status with the Internal Revenue Service, that
determines whether it makes communications subject to the Act.").
FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
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court as inconsistent with FECA itself.145 These rulings indicate that there is
space within existing law to significantly increase the transparency of online
communications in the United States.
2. Transparencyin the United Kingdom
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, legislators in the United Kingdom work
relatively free of judicial restraints on their ability to impose transparency rules
on election-related communications. They nonetheless have struggled with
similar questions of how to define the communications they are regulating, and
whether to treat online communications the same or differently than their offline
equivalents. As discussed below, both systems also have failed to require as
much transparency as would be legally permissible under their respective
regulatory systems.
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) is the
most significant primary legislation regulating transparency in U.K.
campaigns.1 46 As noted above, PPERA limits the campaign expenditures of
national political parties and third-party campaigners.1 47 It also requires
political parties and third-party campaigners to register with the EC, 14 8 and to
149
file regular disclosure reports itemizing their contributions and expenditures.
Whether a third-party campaigner is required to register with the EC
depends on whether the group intends to spend more than a threshold amount
on "regulated campaign activity." 1 50 Regulated campaign activity includes
activities that pass the "purpose test. 15 1 The purpose test defines regulated
campaign activity as activity directed toward the public that "can be reasonably
regarded as intended to influence voters."1 52 Qualifying activities include
efforts to influence voters to vote for or against a political party, candidate, or
145

See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm'n,

316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 422 23 (D.D.C. 2018) ("In contravention of the broad disclosure that
Congress intended when enacting the 1979 FECA Amendments, this regulation falls
short....").
146
See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 c. 41 (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/4
1/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC].
147
1d. §§ 41 69.
14 8
Id.§ 28.
149
1d. § 62.
15 0
THE ELECTORAL COMM'N,OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING 4
(2017), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-07/UKPGE2017 -Overview -of-non-party-regulated-campaign -activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EBCC4R6] [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING].
151d. A 2016 review of the regulation of third-party campaigners in the United
Kingdom proposed replacing the purpose test with an actual intent requirement. THE LORD
HODGSON OF ASTLEY ABBOTTS, supra note 139, at 6. Parliament has not acted on this
proposal.
15 2
NEIL JOHNSTON & JOHN WOODHOUSE, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY,

EU

REFERENDUM AND ALLEGED BREACHES OF ELECTION LAW (EMERGENCY DEBATE), 2018,

CBP 8272 (UK).
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category of candidate; and that those efforts are aimed at, seen, heard by, or
involving the public.1 53 If an activity meets this test, costs counting toward the
reporting threshold include not just the cost of placing the ad, but all costs
involved in its production, publication and distribution. 154
The Communications Act 2003 also defines campaign-related activity, for
the purpose of enforcing its prohibition on the broadcast of political
advertising.1 55 As noted above, the scope of communications prohibited by the
broadcast ban is broad, and includes not just communications from political
parties, but any communication intended to influence elections, legislators, or
the public on matters of public dispute.1 56 This is the most expansive definition
of election-related communications in U.K. election law. As such, it offers a
useful test of the willingness of British and European courts to tolerate farreaching regulation of political communication.
It was subject to just such a test in 2008, when a group called Animal
Defenders International challenged the broadcast ban under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.1 57 Article 10 protects freedom of
expression,1 58 and was incorporated into U.K. domestic law through the Human
Rights Act 1998.159 Animal Defenders wanted to broadcast an advertisement on
the BBC.1 60 The ad featured an image of a girl chained in a cage morphing into
a chimpanzee while a voiceover provided information about the similar
capabilities of chimpanzees and young children.1 61 The objective of the
campaign, according to the group, was not to influence elections but to draw
1 62
public attention to the use of primates for research and recreational purposes.
1 63
When the BBC refused to air the ad, Animal Defenders sued.
The U.K. Supreme Court (sitting at the time as the Lords of Appeal in the
House of Lords)1 64 held the ban was not incompatible with Article 10, even as
15 3

OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING, supra note 150, at 4 5. In the

Brexit referendum, it was defined as activity "intended to, or are otherwise in connection
with, promoting or bringing about a particular outcome in the referendum." JOHNSTON &
WOODHOUSE, supra note 152.
154
See OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING, supra note 150, at 10
(noting that spending on social media that meets the purpose test will require accounting of
all the described costs).
155 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, § 321 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
ukpga/2003/2
I/contents [https://perma.cc/2RED-WWYZ].
15 6
OVERVIEW OF REGULATED NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNING, supra note 150, at 4 6
(overviewing the regulations applying to third-party campaigner communications).
157 R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [1], [2008] 1 AC 1312 (appeal taken from Eng.).
158 European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1951, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
159 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42, § 10 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1998/42/contents [https://perma.cc/Z982-MKWZ].
160
Animal Defenders International[2008] UKHL 15, [4].
16 1
Id. at [50].
1621d. at [3].
163 Id.at [4].
164Id. at [46].
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applied to Animal Defenders' proposed communication.1 65 The court
recognized that public scrutiny of different "views, opinions and policies" is
essential to the democratic process,1 66 but believed that such scrutiny was best
achieved by allowing Parliament to enact legislation ensuring a balanced
presentation of competing ideas, especially on television.1 67 The court did
recognize, consistent with European jurisprudence, that Article 10 requires
restrictions on expression be proportionate to their goals, and that the expansive
definition of "political advertising" in the Communications Act could be
considered overly broad.1 68 But the difficulty of drawing clear lines in this area,
the court said, meant that the court should defer to the considered judgment of
Parliament.1 6 9 The European Court of Human Rights agreed, and allowed the
1 70
broadcast ban to stand.
The key point of Animal Defenders for current purposes is that a very
expansive definition of political advertising was upheld by both U.K. and
European courts, using a deferential standard of review. This means equally
expansive disclosure and imprint (disclaimer) laws-which are much less
restrictive of political expression than the broadcast ban-would likely face few
judicial barriers in the United Kingdom. Despite this, lawmakers in the United
Kingdom, like their counterparts in the United States, have not yet expanded
their transparency rules to capture the full scope of communications decisions
like Animal Defenders leave open to them.
In regard to disclosure, U.K. regulators limit the scope of the nation's
reporting regime by only requiring political parties and third-party campaigners
intending to spend more than a set amount on regulated campaign activities to
register with the EC and provide regular reports of their contributions and
expenditures.1 71 While these registration thresholds are in the same range as
their U.S. counterparts, the U.K. disclosure system overall is quite different.
Regulated groups in the United Kingdom are only required to disclose the

165Id. at [36].
166

Animal Defenders International[2008] UKHL 15, [28]; see also Rowbottom, supra
note 2, at 1 2.
167Animal Defenders International[2008] UKHL 15, [28].
16 8
See id. at [6], [31].
1691d. at [33].

170 Animal Defenders International v. U.K., App. No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{ %22itemid%22: [%22001-119244%22] [https://perma
.cc/4BHN-JLBZ]; cf R (Calver) v. Adjudication Panel for Wales, [2012] EWHC (Admin)
1172, [5], [90] (Wales) (granting claimant's application challenging the dismissal of his
claim by the Adjudication Panel for failure to fully consider the claimant's right to free
expression under Article 10).
171 In 2019, the registration thresholds were £20,000 in England and £10,000 in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, UK PARLIAMENTARY
GENERAL ELECTION 2019: NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNERS 10 (2019), https://www.electoral

commission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019 -11/Non-party%20campaigner%20UKPGE
%202019.pdf [https ://perma.cc/TRF9 -UQGH] [hereinafter UKPGE GUIDANCE].
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identity of donors who donate more than £7500 to the group.1 72 This is much
higher than the $200 triggering public disclosure in the United States.1 73 The
timing of the required reporting also is different. Political parties in the United
Kingdom must provide regular contribution reports during the run-up to a
general election,1 74 but they do not need to report expenditures until three or six
months after an election (with groups that spend more having longer to
report).1 75 Registered third-party campaigners, in turn, are only required to
report contributions and spending during the regulated period, and third-party
campaigning outside the regulated period is not reported at all. 176 Current
reporting rules also allow expenditures to be lumped in unhelpful ways, making
it difficult to trace online spending through the reports, and the EC has only
limited authority to compel third-party campaign groups to disclose the
177
underlying source of the funds they receive.
There also are significant differences between the United States and United
Kingdom in regard to imprint (disclaimer) requirements. Imprint rules in the
United Kingdom are in several ways more extensive than those found in the
United States. Any person or group distributing to the public material meeting
the purpose test must include an imprint on the material, whether or not they are
required to register with the EC. 178 There is no minimum spending threshold
triggering this obligation. 179 Because the purpose test itself is quite broad, this
means that imprints are required on more types of communications in the United
Kingdom than in the United States. But there is one big exception to this: as of
this writing there is no imprint requirement applicable to online
172 Donations and Loans, ELECTORAL COMMISSION,

https://www.electoralcommission

org.uk/who -we -are -and -what-we -do/financial -reporting/donations -and-loans [https:
//perma.cc/PJ27-4JU3]
(last updated July 30, 2019).
173
See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2017).

17 4

THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF DONATIONS TO POLITICAL PARTIES 7,

https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/

data/assets/pdf file/00 14/102263/to -donations-

rp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU28-7L8X] [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF DONATIONS TO POLITICAL
PARTIES].
175 OVERVIEW OF PARTY CAMPAIGN SPENDING, supra note 53, at 15; see also DIGITAL
CAMPAIGNING,

supra note 83,

76.

176 DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83,

40-41; UKPGE

GUIDANCE,

supra note

171, at 6. To avoid manipulation of these rules, contributions made outside that time frame
must be reported if used to fund expenditures made during it. See generally THE ELECTORAL
COMM'N,

REPORTING

DONATIONS

AND LOANS:

PARTIES

WITH ACCOUNTING

UNITS,

http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/-data/assets/pdf-file/001 6/1 2283/sp -reportingwith-au-rp.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN88-HB9W] (describing the process by which registered
central party treasurers must report certain donations and loans).
177
See DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83, at 3 (recommending further itemized
reports
to increase third-party transparency in digital spending).
17 8

THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, FACTSHEET FOR NON-PARTY CAMPAIGNERS: ELECTION

MATERIAL AND IMPRINTS
GREAT BRITAIN, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
sites/default/files/pdf
file/fs -imprints -npc.pdf [https://perma.cc/B 8X7-A932].
179
See id. The test requires that covered material be distributed to the public, which
imposes a practical limitation on the breadth of the rule. Id.
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communications. 180 The U.K. government has agreed to develop rules requiring
online imprints, but has not yet done so.1 8 1 As the robust online campaign during
the Brexit referendum made clear, this leaves a gaping hole in the United
Kingdom's transparency regime.
Scotland experimented with plugging that hole during the 2015 vote on
Scottish independence. The parliaments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland enjoy certain devolved powers, including the ability to regulate local
elections.1 82 Exercising this power, the Scottish Parliament required any
material "wholly or mainly related" to the independence referendum to include
1 83
an imprint, regardless of whether the material was distributed on or off line.
The "wholly or mainly related" test was even broader than the purpose test used
in nationwide elections, and there was no threshold spending requirement-any
communication meeting the test was required to carry an imprint.1 84 This
created a sweeping online imprint requirement.
It was only partially successful. In a report submitted to Parliament after the
Scottish referendum, the EC noted that the scope of the disclosure requirement
meant that a potentially wide amount of online material was captured by the
rule, and that this had created confusion among campaigners about what
communications were in fact required to carry imprints.1 85 In particular, the EC
reported receiving questions about whether communications posted on personal
Facebook and Twitter accounts were within the scope of the rule, and if so where
on these pages the imprints should appear.1 86 The EC's response was to advise
campaigners that social media accounts "focused primarily on campaigning"
needed to carry imprints on their Facebook homepage or Twitter profile, but that
180

Michela Palese, Imprints Finally Some Action to Update Our Analogue Laws for

the Digital Age, ELECTORAL REFORM SOC'Y (May 7, 2019), https://www.electoralreform.rg.uk/imprints -finally- some -action- to -update -our-analogue -laws- for- the -digital age/ 18[https://perma.cc/RXK4-FP9N].
1

Natasha Lomas, Digital Campaigning vs Democracy: UK Election Regulator Calls
for Urgent Law Changes, TECHCRUNCH (June 26, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/

06/26/digital -campaigning -vs-democracy-uk-election -regulator- calls-for-urgent-lawchanges/ [https://perma.cc/T3P6-4CXT] ("A Cabinet Office spokesperson said: 'The
government is committed to increasing transparency in digital campaigning, in order to
maintain a fair and proportionate democratic process, and we will be consulting on proposals
for new imprint requirements on electronic campaigning in due course. "'); see PROTECTING
THE DEBATE, supra note 5, at 33 34 ("[We] will carefully consider [transparency concerns
from voters] as we develop the policy for a digital imprint regime.").
182 See, e.g., Scotland Act 2012 c. 11, § 1 (giving the administration of elections to
Scottish Parliament).
183 THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM 110 (Dec. 2014),

http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/--data/assets/pdf-file/0010/179812/Scottish
-independence -referendum-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5A-72XP] [hereinafter SCOTTISH
INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM].

184 PROTECTING THE DEBATE, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that "any digital material" that
met the test required an imprint) (emphasis added).
185 SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM, supra note 183, at 110 11.
186Id. at 110.
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individuals or organizations who were 'just expressing their views" through
18 7
their own accounts were not covered by the requirement.
As the EC acknowledged in its post-election report, the distinction between
using a social media account to focus primarily on campaigning versus using
one to simply express your own views is far from crisp, and will require
clarification if online imprint requirements become the norm in U.K.
elections.1 88 Nonetheless, the Scottish referendum provides a useful first look at
a real-world effort to provide greater campaign transparency online.

3. TransparencyRecap
As evidenced by the number and prominence of proposed reforms in this
category, increasing transparency around online communications is an
important tool in combatting disinformation and foreign interference in
democratic elections. Fortunately, U.S. and U.K. laws regulating transparency
are sufficiently similar to allow each country to learn from the other in this area.
In both countries, disclaimer and disclosure rules can be triggered either by who
you are or what you say. Both countries also require that candidates, political
parties, and some third-party campaigners report their income and expenditures
to an agency overseeing election activity. Both countries likewise require many
political communications to carry disclaimers, but not all election-related
communications are included in those requirements, especially when occurring
online.
The legal challenges facing each country in this area also are surprisingly
similar. Both countries are struggling with how to design online disclaimer and
disclosure requirements that balance the regulatory burden imposed by such
requirements with the need for public awareness of who is authorizing and
paying for online campaigns. The United States can gain valuable insights by
in-depth study of the groundbreaking Scottish experiment with online imprints,
while the United Kingdom has much to learn from careful consideration of the
long path already trod by U.S. courts and legislatures trying to distinguish
regulated campaign communications from unregulated political expression.
These are not easy issues, and the experiences of the two countries have much
to offer each other in evaluating them.

The United States also could learn from the United Kingdom's experience
using pay-to-produce rather than a pay-to-place thresholds for online disclosure
and disclaimer requirements. Online advertising is significantly less expensive
than its offline counterparts, and often is shared organically between users rather
than by the initial distributor. Developing regulatory thresholds that capture the
actual expenses incurred in implementing these types of campaigns is critical to
increasing transparency, but is tricky to do well. The United Kingdom has more
18 7

1d.

188The report advised against changing the rule immediately because Brexit
campaigning had already begun. Id.at 111 n.41.
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experience than the United States in using this measure, and U.S. lawmakers
can benefit from that experience as they consider the appropriate reach of
proposed reforms like those found in the DISCLOSE and Honest Ads Acts.
There are other insights to be gleaned as well. In the United States, the
reports regularly filed by FEC-registered groups provide more timely and
detailed information than those collected by the EC. The U.S. system therefore
could provide useful guidance as the United Kingdom considers whether and
how to change the timing and nature of its own reporting system to increase its
value to voters. The United States, in turn, has much to gain by careful review
of the decisions the United Kingdom has made in regard to balancing
transparency with the privacy interests of smaller donors. This issue is becoming
more important in the United States as disclosure rules come under increased
pressure; the United Kingdom experience using a significantly higher public
disclosure threshold than that found in the United States may hold valuable
lessons for the U.S. reform community.
C. Source Exclusions
Unlike transparency rules, source exclusions prohibit some entities from
participating in a nation's democratic deliberations at all, even if their
participation is fully disclosed. Most countries that regulate money in politics
prohibit or restrict the election-related activities of foreign entities in some
way,1 89 and reform proposals in this category are generally geared toward
strengthening those rules. In the United States and United Kingdom, these
proposals include increasing and better enforcing restrictions on political
expenditures by foreign actors, non-citizens, and subsidiaries of foreign-owned
corporations;1 90 requiring online platforms to verify the domestic identity of
entities purchasing online campaign communications;1 91 and tightening
1 92
prohibitions on foreign contributions to candidates and political parties.
Despite their ubiquity, source exclusions raise a host of problems. To start
with, defining "foreign" can be surprisingly problematic, particularly in regard

189 See, e.g., Myles Martin, Foreign Nationals,FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (June 23,

2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/foreign-nationals/ [https://perma.cc/TS3V-JPQK]
(listing several categories of U.S. election activities from which foreign nationals are
prohibited).
190
See, e.g., id. ("[F]oreign nationals are prohibited from... [m]aking any contribution
or donation of money or other thing of value, or making any expenditure, independent
expenditure, or disbursement in connection with any federal, state or local election in the
United States .... ").
191 See, e.g., id. ("[F]oreign nationals are prohibited from... [m]aking any
disbursement for an electioneering communication .... ).
192
See, e.g., id. ("[F]oreign nationals are prohibited from... [m]aking any contribution
or donation to any committee or organization of any national, state, district, or local political
party .... ).
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1 93
to multi-generational diaspora communities and transnational corporations.
It also can be challenging to operationalize source exclusions online, where
194
information readily crosses borders and original sources are easily obscured.
Finally, it can be difficult to articulate a legally compelling reason why a voter
should be prevented from hearing a properly attributed message just because of
the foreign status of the messenger-and not everyone agrees such restrictions
are appropriate.1 9 5 Addressing these issues is critical to crafting and defending
workable foreign source exclusion rules in both the United States and the United
Kingdom.

1. Source Exclusions in the United States
Restrictions on foreign involvement in domestic elections have been part of
U.S. law since at least 1938, when Congress enacted the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA) in response to fears that German nationals were being
paid to distribute Nazi propaganda in the United States. 196 The restrictions were
tightened in the 1960s, after a Senate investigation revealed that campaign
contributions had been channeled to congressional candidates by Filipino sugar
industry magnates, 1 97 and again in the 1990s after reports of Chinese nationals
using "soft money" donations to gain access to high-level government officials
19 8
in the Clinton Administration.
The distinction developed in Buckley between campaign contributions and
expenditures shapes this legal landscape as well. In regard to contributions,
19 3

See Joo-Cheong Tham, Of Aliens, Money and Politics: Should Foreign Political

Donations Be Banned?, 28 KING'S L.J. 262, 267 68 (2017) (describing countries' different
definitions of "foreign" actors as being undergirded by different integrity-preservation
concerns).
194
See generally Amol Rajan, The Constant Influence of DarkAds, BBC NEWS (Mar.
11, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-47524230 [https://perma.cc/
U4RN-YJQ5] (describing the inherent difficulty in pinpointing the source of online political
advertisements).
195
See CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., EXAMINING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS
41 (Jan. 2018), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-interactivepages.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGG2-CWRK]. See generally Jeffrey K. Powell, Note,
Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning Their
Justification in a Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 957 (1996)
(exploring purported justifications for excluding foreign influence on domestic elections).
196Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 21 (1982)); Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial
Electioneering and the Globalization of American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 162,
171 (2009).
197 Teachout, supra note 196, at 172.
19 8
H.R. REP. No. 105-829, at 61 & n.69 (1998). "Soft money" is money used to engage
in party-building activities and is regulated separately under FECA. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101
(Supp. IV 2017); see also FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FAQ ON THE BCRA AND OTHER NEW
RULES 3 (Feb. 2005), https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/bcra-brochure.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F2T8-6E2C].
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candidates and political parties are categorically prohibited from soliciting,
accepting, or receiving donations from foreign nationals. 19 9 It is likewise illegal
for a foreign national to directly or indirectly contribute money or other "things
of value" to a candidate in any federal, state, or local election. 200 FECA also
prohibits knowingly assisting foreign nationals in circumventing the foreign
source exclusion ban, while FARA prevents circumvention by prohibiting U.S.
agents from making contributions on behalf of their foreign principals. 20 1 These
rules have consistently been upheld under the Buckley paradigm subjecting
regulations of contributions to a relatively relaxed level of constitutional
202
scrutiny.
Source-based expenditure bans present a more complicated legal question
in the United States. The Supreme Court dealt with source-based expenditures
bans most recently in Citizens United.20 3 As discussed above, Citizens United

upheld the broad disclosure and disclaimer requirements imposed by BCRA on
broadcast electioneering communications. But the case is better known for
striking down a source-based ban on the use of corporate general revenue funds
to fund the independent expenditures of corporations. Prior to Citizens United,
U.S. law permitted corporations to use these funds to purchase "issue ads" but
they were prohibited from using them to purchase express advocacy (under
FECA) or electioneering communications deemed the functional equivalent of
express advocacy (under BCRA and subsequent court decisions). 20 4 The Court
held in Citizens United that this source-based expenditure ban violated the First
205
Amendment.
In doing so, the Citizens United Court used sweeping language to condemn
source-based regulations of political speech. 20 6 The government, the Court said,
may not "deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration." 20 7 This strong rhetoric
19952 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. IV 2017).
1d.; 11 C.F.R. 110.20(b) (2019). BCRA also includes a sentencing enhancement for
campaign finance violations involving foreign contributions specifically from or directed by
foreign governments. Ciara Torres -Spelliscy, Dark Money as a Political Sovereignty
Problem, 28 KING'S L.J. 239, 253 (2017).
201 See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. IV 2017); 22 U.S.C. § 614(e) (2012).
202
InMay 2019, the Supreme Court declined to review a Massachusetts law prohibiting
20 0

such contributions. IA Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 105 N.E.3d
1175, 1181 82 (Mass. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2613 (2019).
203
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
204
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101 30145 (Supp. IV 2017); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This
is a narrower definition of BCRA's "electioneering communications" than is applicable to
transparency laws. As discussed above in Part I, the Court has made clear that this narrower
definition is not constitutionally compelled in regard to transparency requirements.
205 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.
206
See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 217, 223 (2010).
207 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
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cast constitutional doubt on all source-based expenditure restrictions, including
the foreign-source bans found in both FECA and BCRA. 20 8 So it was not
surprising when the federal district court for the District of Columbia was asked
just a year after Citizens United was decided to consider whether those bans
were also unconstitutional.
The case, Bluman v. FEC,involved two foreign nationals legally living in
the United States who wanted to make express advocacy expenditures
supporting candidates for federal office but were prevented from doing so by
BCRA's foreign expenditure ban. 20 9 Writing for the majority, then-Judge Brett
Kavanaugh upheld the law. 210 In doing so, he brought into play a line of
Supreme Court decisions, present but not emphasized in Citizens United,
establishing the constitutional permissibility of excluding foreigners from
certain tasks considered central to democratic self-government. 21 1 The gist of
these cases is that excluding foreign nationals from activities "intimately
related" to the process of self-government is constitutionally acceptable, even
when such distinctions would not be tolerated elsewhere. 21 2 As the Bluman
court noted, this doctrine has been used by the Supreme Court to uphold laws
excluding foreign nationals from serving as jurors, holding elected office, and
voting. 21 3 The power to exclude foreign nationals from such areas, the Bluman
court said, is a core component of a nation's right and duty to preserve itself as
a political community; to define, in other words, who is and is not a member of
2 14

a given polis.

Drawing on this line of cases, Bluman held that the First Amendment did
not bar the government from trying to restrict foreign influence over how voters
cast their ballots, at least to the extent presented in the case before the court
(which was limited to express advocacy). 21 5 Elections, the court said, are "an
integral aspect" of the process of self-governance, and spending money to
influence voters is "at least as (and probably far more)" 2 16 closely related to

democratic self-government than other tasks the Supreme Court had applied the
21 7
doctrine to, such as serving as a probation officer or public school teacher.
Nothing in Citizens United precluded this result, according to the Bluman court,
20 8

See Levitt, supra note 206, at 222.
See generally Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011).
210 Id.at 292.
209

211Id. at 287.
2 12
1d. (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984).
2 13
1d.

214Id. at 287 88.
2 15
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
216Id. at 288 89.

217 See, e.g., Bernal, 467 U.S. at 220; Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439
(1981); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73 74 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). As Ciara Torres-Spelliscy
notes, this body of law is grounded in the same concerns that animate the Constitution's
Emoluments Clause. See Torres -Spelliscy, supra note 200, at 251.
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and the self-governance line of cases dictated it.21 8 Therefore, limiting foreign
influence over American democracy was a sufficiently compelling interest to
21 9
justify the foreign source expenditures ban being challenged.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Bluman.220 But there is
considerable tension between Citizens United, which is deeply skeptical of the
legitimacy of source-based bans and reserves to voters the power to critically
assess political information, and the rationale of Bluman, which emphasizes the
power and duty of sovereign states to protect voters from foreign influence even
when properly disclosed. 221 This uncertainty caused difficulties almost
immediately after Bluman was decided when the FEC was presented with a
complaint alleging that a foreign national spent $327,000 opposing a California
22 2
ballot referendum.
223
The FEC commissioners could not agree whether to act on the complaint.
The disagreement turned on whether Bluman's validation of foreign expenditure
bans in a candidate election logically extended to a ban on foreign expenditures
in a referendum. 224 The legal distinction between candidate elections and
referendums dated to before Citizens United, when the Supreme Court had held
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that corporations could not be
prohibited from using general corporate revenue funds to fund expenditures
related to a referendum campaign. 225 The Bellotti Court's reasoning was that
there was no candidate in a referendum campaign who could be "corrupted" by
corporate money, and therefore no risk of quid pro quo corruption justifying the
226
restriction.
The FEC commissioners in favor of dismissing the California complaint
argued that Bellotti, not Bluman, governed because the complaint involved a
ballot referendum, not a candidate election. 22 7 The FEC commissioners in favor
of advancing it argued that Bluman's language regarding the importance of
protecting democratic self-governance established a distinct compelling interest
justifying foreign source exclusions that applied with equal force in candidate
2 18

Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 289.

219 Id. at 288.
220

Bluman v. Fed. Election Comt'n, 565 U.S. 1104, 1104 (2012).
221 See Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First
Amendment, 34 FJARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 663, 663 64 (2011); see also Richard L. Hasen,
Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
200, 218 19 (2017).
222
See In the Matter of MindGeek, MUR 6678, 1 (Fed. Election Comm'n 2015),
https://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/15044372963.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV2P-U3GY].
223

Id. at 2.
224 Id.

225 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
226 Id. at 790.
227
MindGeek, MUR 6678, at 1 2; Statement of Reasons of Chair Ann M. Ravel at 2, In
the Matter of MindGeek, MUR 6678 (Fed. Election Comm'n 2015); Statement of Reasons
of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub at 1, In the Matter of MindGeek, MUR 6678 (Fed.
Election Comm'n 2015).
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and referendum campaigns. 228 Bluman, those commissioners argued, had
carved out a "no-go" zone for foreign participation in American politics that
applied regardless of the nature of the underlying vote. 229 Because the
commissions deadlocked over this issue, the FEC took no action on the
230
complaint.
The dispute over the California complaint reveals an important and
unresolved issue in U.S. law regarding foreign source exclusion bans. Since
Buckley, opponents of campaign finance regulation have argued that the only
constitutionally acceptable justification supporting such regulations is the
231
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.
Except for a brief deviation in 1990, the Supreme Court has generally seemed
to agree. 232 The unresolved issue is whether that limitation also applies to
foreign source bans. The commissioners' disagreement in the California case
pushes this point. If the only constitutionally acceptable reason to permit foreign
source bans is to prevent the appearance or actuality of quid pro quo corruption,
then such a ban could not be constitutionally applied to a referendum campaign
where there is no candidate to corrupt. If,on the other hand, the Bluman
rationale about protecting voters from foreign influence is a constitutionally
acceptable justification distinct from concerns about quid pro quo candidate
corruption, then it should apply with equal force to both candidate and
referendum campaigns. As the dispute between the FEC commissioners in the
California case demonstrates, the lack of clarity on this point leaves unclear both
233
the scope and justification of U.S. foreign source exclusion laws.
2. Source Exclusions in the United Kingdom
The law governing source exclusions in the United Kingdom is similar to
that in the United States. Once again, the relevant primary legislation is PPERA.
When PPERA was enacted, there was significant concern about foreign
donations made in the 1990s to British political parties, particularly Prime
Minister John Major's Conservative Party, which had been criticized for

228

Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub at 3-4, In the Matter of

MindGeek, MUR 6678 (Fed. Election Comm'n 2015).
2291Id. at 3.
230

231

MindGeek, MUR 6678 at 2.
See Hasen, supra note 49, at 38, 40 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l

Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985)); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 232
U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990). Citizens
United rejected other justifications for limiting expenditures, but accepted a wider array of
reasons supporting disclosure and disclaimer rules. Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n,
558 U.S. 310, 318, 369 (2010).
233
L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45320, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW:
AN

ANALYSIS

OF

KEY

ISSUES,

RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS,

CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATION 24 25 (2018).

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

FIRST AMENDMENT (UN)EXCEPTIONALISM

2020]

accepting donations tied to Serbia, Cyprus, and Russia. 234 The Labour Party
leveraged those concerns in the 1997 general election by including a foreign
source ban in its election manifesto. 235 When Labour won, the new government
asked the Neill Committee to include the ban in its study of political party
funding reforms. The PPERA, as noted above, was the end result of the Neill
236
Committee's work.
Under PPERA, contributions to political parties and registered third-party
campaigners can only be accepted from "permissible donors." 237 Permissible
donors include individuals registered on a U.K. electoral register, U.K.registered political parties, U.K.-registered business organizations, and
subsidiaries of foreign corporations registered and doing business in the United
Kingdom. 23 8 British citizens living abroad are permissible donors, as are noncitizen residents legally living in the United Kingdom. 239 Political parties and
registered third parties are statutorily responsible for verifying that the donations
they accept are from permissible donors, and they are legally obligated to return
donations that cannot be verified. 240 Additionally, only entities who are
241
themselves permissible donors can register as third-party campaigners.
Because they cannot register as third-party campaigners, foreign entities also
therefore cannot legally engage in regulated campaign spending exceeding the
242
registration threshold.
In recommending these rules, the Neill Committee, like the court in Bluman,
243
relied on concepts of national self-governance and the democratic process.
British political parties, the Committee reasoned, are chosen by and responsible
to British citizens, and their actions should not be influenced by outsiders with
no "genuine stake" in the country. 24 4 Therefore, only those who live, work, or
234

See NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 235 36; see also Navraj Singh Ghaleigh,

Expenditure, Donations and Public Funding under the United Kingdom's Political Parties,
Elections and Referendums Act 2000 And Beyond?, in 2006 PARTY FUNDING AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCING ININTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (KD Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff

eds., 2006).
235 COMM. FOR PRIVILEGES, FIRST REPORT,

1998 99, HL, at app. 4(5) (UK), https://

publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 199899/ldselect/ldprivi/1 06i/1 06i 13.htm [https://perma
.cc/8PQ2-4TTJ].
236
See HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS

BILL

DONATIONS, 1999 2000, HC, at 3.

237 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 54 (UK), http://www

.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/4 1/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC].
238 Id.
239

See id.

240 See id. § 56. These permissible donor rules also apply to individual candidates and
registered
third-party campaigners. See id. §§ 22 24.
24 1
Id. § 56.
242 Id.
243
244

See NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 68.
1d. Worldwide, foreign donation bans are one of the most common campaign

financing restrictions. See Is There a Ban on Donationsfrom Foreign Interests to Political
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do business in the United Kingdom should be "entitled to support financially
the operation of the political process." 24 5 But the Neill Committee had to
grapple with some sensitive issues in deciding how to implement this idea in the
United Kingdom. It struggled with two questions in particular, both of which
would become relevant years later in the Brexit campaign: how to define
"foreign" in a country comprised of distinct nations with large diaspora
populations and varying levels of devolved power, and how to prevent foreign
corporations from channeling outside funds through subsidiaries registered in
the United Kingdom. 246
Defining "foreign" in the United Kingdom context was the Neill
Committee's first challenge. If everyone who was not a U.K. citizen and resident
was considered an impermissible donor, the Scottish National Party and Plaid
Cymru (the Scottish and Welsh independence parties) would be
disproportionately-and in their view unfairly-disadvantaged. 247 Under such
a ban, their candidates would face Labour and Conservative Party opponents
who could be funded by English money while being unable to raise competing
funds from their own supporters abroad. 248 These parties historically had been
supported financially by their expatriates, and they considered those expats to
be no differently situated than English nationals who donated money to prounion candidates standing for election in Scotland or Wales. 24 9 The relationship
of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland raised additional problems, both
in terms of who would be considered "foreign" for purposes of donating to
political parties in Northern Ireland, and whether those donations should be
250
publicly disclosed in a still-volatile political environment.
These concerns led the Neill Committee to recommend a nuanced approach
to foreign source bans. It decided against creating general exceptions for foreign
supporters of national independence parties, but partially appeased the concerns
of those parties by including U.K. citizens living abroad as permissible
donors. 251 The Neill Committee went further in regard to Northern Ireland,
concluding that both pragmatic concerns and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
warranted allowing Irish citizens and companies doing the business in the
Republic of Ireland to be treated as not foreign for purposes of donations to
Northern Irish political parties. 252 The Committee also recommended that
Parties?, INT'L IDEA, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-view/527

[https://perma

.cc/Z44H-QXE4].
245

NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 70.
246Id. at 64, 67 68.
247 Id. at 70.
248 Id.
249

Graeme Orr, Is My Foreign Yours? The Concept of Foreignness in the Comparative

Regulation of Political Finance, 55 J. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 179, 193 nn.28 29

(2019).
250

NEILL REPORT,

supra note 2, at 48-49.

251Id. at 72.
252

See id.at 76 (The Good Friday Agreement recognized the right of all people on the
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FIRST AMENDMENT (UN)EXCEPTIONALISM

2020]

political donations in Northern Ireland be given a short-term exemption from
otherwise applicable public disclosure rules. 2 53 These recommendations were
accepted by the government and adopted in PPERA, 254 with the additional
caveat that Northern Irish political parties were prohibited from making
donations to parties and other regulated entities in the greater United Kingdom
255
to avoid circumvention of the foreign source ban outside of Northern Ireland.
Corporate money presented a second challenge to the Neill Committee.
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has never had a generally
applicable ban on corporate contributions or expenditures. The Committee
struggled with whether or not U.K.-registered subsidiaries of foreign companies
should be considered permissible donors. 256 Because such subsidiaries were
presumed to be doing business in the United Kingdom, they were directly
affected by U.K. law and arguably part of the U.K. political community. 257 But
because they were subsidiaries of foreign corporations, they also were possible
conduits of foreign money promoting foreign interests. 258 Partnerships
comprised of international members and limited liability companies presented
259
variations of the same problem.
The Neill Committee adopted a compromise approach here as well,
recommending that U.K.-registered subsidiaries be included as permissible
donors but that they be required to demonstrate that they had sufficient U.K.based business activity to independently fund their U.K. donations. 260 The
legislation ultimately accepted the Committee's recommendation that
subsidiaries of foreign corporations must be both registered and doing business
in the United Kingdom to qualify as permissible donors, but did not require such
entities to demonstrate that their U.K. donations could be supported by revenue
26 1
generated within the country.
Under PPERA, U.K. law bans foreign contributions but defines
"foreignness" in ways designed to be sensitive to the history and circumstances

253

See id. at61.

254 THE

ELECTORAL

COMM'N,

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

POLITICAL

DONATIONS

IN NORTHERN

IRELAND,

4 (2007), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/

sites/default/files/electoral commission-pdf-file/FAQs -Nldonations_27546-20278
N_.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4WN-SMAD].
255 See id.
256 British election law does not regulate corporate contributions differently than other
contributions, but British corporate law requires such contributions to be disclosed to and
authorized by shareholders. Ciara Torres -Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, ShareholderAuthorized
Corporate PoliticalSpending in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 525, 526 (2011).
257 See NEILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 68.
258 Id. at 74.
259 Id. at 73.
260 Id.

261 See 2016 EU REFERENDUM, supra note 5, at 101; see also DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING,
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of the United Kingdom's constitutive parts. 262 For enforcement purposes, the
law puts the burden on parties, candidates, and registered third-party
campaigners to verify that they only accept donations from permissible donors,
263 It
and requires that they return funds whose origins cannot be ascertained.
also prohibits foreign entities from registering as third-party campaigners,
thereby rendering it illegal for such entities to spend above the triggering
threshold on any regulated campaign activities, which includes most activity
264
intended to influence voters during an election period.
Despite this relatively nuanced approach, the issues that troubled the Neill
Committee reappeared during the Brexit referendum. In fact, the largest scandal
to emerge from the Brexit campaign involved fears that foreign money had been
channeled to several pro-Leave campaign groups through a web of
interconnected corporations. 265 The concerns centered on U.K. businessman
Arron Banks and an entity he created called Leave.EU. 26 6 Leave.EU registered
with the EC as a third-party campaigner and reported receiving millions of
pounds of donations from Banks. 267 It then used these funds to finance not only
its own campaign, but also to make large donations to five separately registered
268
pro-Leave groups.
When these transactions became public, concerns were raised about whether
Banks, whose business ventures appeared from public records to have limited
cash flow and high debt loads, had actually been the source of these funds. 269 In
response, the EC opened an investigation. 270 The investigation revealed that
Leave.EU had operated its campaign through a separate entity, Better for the
Country Limited (BFTC), and that BFTC had received £6 million in funding to
pay Leave.EU's referendum expenses and an additional £2 million to use for
other referendum spending in the form of donations to other registered campaign
groups. 271 BFTC reported that this entire amount-£8 million-was received
from Banks in the form of donations or loans from him or his U.K.-based
insurance companies. 272 BFTC was incorporated by Banks in the United

262 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 54 (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/4
1/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC].
263
1d. §§ 54-56.
264
1d. § 88.
265 This included the use of anti-migrant images that appear to have been faked.
Revealed: How Leave.EU Faked Migrant Footage, CHANNEL 4 NEws (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.channel4.com/news/revealed-how-leave-eu- faked-migrant- footage [https://
perma.cc/NY67-XA4W].
266 Investigation into Payments, supra note 5.

267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.

272 Investigation into Payments, supra note 5.
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Kingdom in May 2015, and it was not improper or illegal for Leave.EU to run
273
its referendum campaign through BFTC.
What the EC was concerned about was the involvement of Rock Holdings
Limited, another Banks entity incorporated in the Isle of Man. 274 Rock Holdings
is not registered or doing business in the United Kingdom, and is not a
permissible donor under U.K. law. 275 So money or loans supplied by Rock
Holdings could potentially violate the U.K. foreign source ban. The EC's postBrexit report to Parliament itemized these concerns. 276 The EC reported that it
believed there were reasonable grounds to suspect that Rock Holdings was a
party to the donations and loans made by Banks to BFTC and used to fund
Leave.EU and, through it, other pro-Leave campaigners. 277 The report also
stated that the EC had reason to believe that Banks knew this, that he
intentionally used prohibited foreign sources to fund campaign activities, and
that he concealed the true source of those funds in violation of U.K. law. 278 The
EC referred the matter to the National Crime Agency, 279 which subsequently
cleared Banks and Rock Holdings of criminal wrongdoing. 280 The EC in
response has recommended additional election law changes to close what it sees
281
as a loophole in the United Kingdom's foreign source funding ban.
The Banks matter is not the only foreign funding scandal to emerge from
Brexit. There also was concern during the referendum that the non-disclosure
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. The Isle of Man is a British Overseas Territory, but is not part of the United

Kingdom and does not have EU membership through its affiliation with Britain. Isle of Man
entities are not permissible donors under PPERA and were not made so by the amendments
regarding the Brexit referendum. THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, DONATIONS AND LOANS:
GUIDANCE FOR REGULATED DONEES IN GREAT BRITAIN 26 (rev. Jan 2010), https://www
.electoralcommission.org.uk/_data/assets/electoral commission-pdf file/0019/1370
8/026 -regulated -donees -guidance -final.pdf [https://perma.cc/99FJ-D9KT].
276 Investigation into Payments, supra note 5.
277 Id.
27 8

Arron Banks, Better for the Country and Others Referred to the National Crime
Agency for Multiple Suspected Offences, ELECTORAL COMMISSION, https://www.electoral
commission.org.uk/i-am-a/Journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/party-and-election
-finance -to -keep/arron -banks, -better- for- the -country- and -others -referred -to- the -national crime -agency- for-multiple -suspected -offences [https://perma.cc/L86F-S3R2] (last updated
Oct.279
11, 2019).
DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, at74 75. Banks denies these allegations. Brexit: Arron
Banks Challenged over Leave.EU Funds, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.bbc

.com/news/uk-politics-46089236 [https://perma.cc/96L3-9AHB].
280Public Statement on NCA Investigation into Suspected EU Referendum Offences,
NAT'L CRIME AGENCY (Sept. 24,2019), https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/public

-statement-on-nca-investigation -into- suspected-eu-referendum-offences [https://perma
.cc/J34R-VAXB].
28 1
Statement Following the National Crime Agency's Announcement, ELECTORAL
COMMISSION (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/statement-follow
ing-national-crime-agencys-announcement [https://perma.cc/SX8V-D34Z].
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provision of PPERA in relation to contributions made to political parties in
Northern Ireland was used to shield the source of funds used to purchase antiEU advertising throughout the United Kingdom. 28 2 These concerns involved an
entity called the Constitutional Research Counsel (CRC), an unincorporated
organization based in Scotland. 28 3 During the Brexit referendum, the CRC gave
£435,000 to the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). 284 The
DUP is the dominant party in Northern Ireland's devolved parliament, and the
285
only Northern Irish party to sit in the Westminster Parliament.
The CRC's £435,000 donation to the DUP was the largest ever made in
Northern Ireland. 286 But because at the time of the Brexit campaign PPERA
prohibited public disclosure of political donations in Northern Ireland, the
28 7
underlying funding sources of CRC itself were not publicly disclosed.
Disclosure reports made by the DUP to the EC showed that much of this money
was used to fund anti-EU messaging throughout the United Kingdom, including
a full-page newspaper ad in London and targeted Facebook ads arranged by
Aggregate IQ (a Canadian data firm linked to Cambridge Analytica and also
28 8
implicated in the allegedly improper use of Facebook user data).
Restrictions on public disclosure of Northern Ireland political party funding
have been lifted since the Brexit vote, but the EC remains prohibited by law
from providing information about donations that were legally confidential at the
time they were made. 28 9 The EC's Chief Commissioner told a Parliamentary
committee that the EC had verified that the donors listed on the DUP election
290
reports were permissible, but was prohibited by law from elaborating further.
This lack of public disclosure about the CRC's underlying funding has spurred
2 91
continuing suspicions about the propriety of these transactions.

282
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supra note 5, at 64-65.

283 Id. at 64.

284Id. at 64-65.
285 Sinn F6in, the Irish republican political party, successfully elects Westminster MPs
from constituency districts in Northern Ireland, but the party's MPs abstain from taking their
seats in protest over Britain's continuing claims of sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Paul
Maskey, Editorial, I'm a Sinn Fin MP. This Is Why I Won't Go to Westminster, Even over
Brexit, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/

mar/06/sinn- fein-mp-british-parliament-irish-republicans-brexit [https://perma.cc/6D5VTT6T].
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DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, at 6465.
287 See id.
288 Id. at 45-48; see also INFO. COMM'R'S OFFICE, supra note 5, at 49 50.
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DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, at 65.
290 Conclusion of Assessments into Allegations Regarding Certain EU Referendum
Campaigners, ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.electoralcomm

ission.org.uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/referendums-to-keep
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The Brexit campaign revealed additional gaps in the United Kingdom's
foreign source exclusion laws. As noted above, PPERA requires any third-party
campaigner intending to spend over the threshold amount on regulated activities
to register with the EC. 292 Impermissible donors, including foreign entities,
cannot legally register and therefore cannot legally engage in spending over the
threshold amount. 293 But it appears there is no provision in U.K. law preventing
foreign actors from spending under the registration threshold. Consequently, in
the Brexit referendum, foreign actors could spend up to £10,000 on election
activity without running afoul of the law. 294 A similar issue exists on the
donation side: foreign entities are not permissible donors, but "donations" are
defined as contributions of £500 or more. 2 95 Since contributions under £500 are
not "donations," they also are not governed by the permissible donor
296
requirements.
These gaps mean that much Brexit-related content promoted on social
media by foreign actors did not violate U.K. law. While foreign-funded
Facebook activity seems to have played less of a role in the Brexit referendum
than in the United States presidential election, reviews conducted after the
referendum indicate that Russian entities did purchase some Brexit-related
advertisements, and data released by Twitter shows accounts affiliated with the
St. Petersburg operation promoted Brexit tweets. 29 7 But as long as the cost of
these communications was under the third-party campaigner registration
threshold of £10,000, these expenditures would have been legally
permissible. 298

292 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 88 (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/4 1/contents [https://perma.cc/MNB4-S9HC].
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TAMBINI ET AL., LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI,

MEDIA POLICY BRIEF 19: THE NEW

(Mar. 2017), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/7/LSE%20MPP
%20Policy%20Brief%2019%20-%2OThe%20new%20political%20campaigning-final
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING 7

.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5UR-8HBK]; Peter Geoghegan, Revealed: The Dirty Secrets of
the DUP's 'Dark Money' Brexit Donor, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www

.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-investigations/revealed -dirty- secrets-of -dup-s -darkmoney-brexit-donor/
[https://perma.cc/8APP-5MKQ].
295
296

297

OVERVIEW OF DONATIONS TO POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 174, at 3.
DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING, supra note 83, 86.

Llewellyn et al., supra note 140, at 1148-49; see also DCMS

REPORT,

supra note 5,

at 76.

29 8

See DCMS REPORT, supra note 5, at 93; see also Geoghegan, supra note 294. More
recently, anti-EU political parties in the United Kingdom have been accused of taking
advantage of this gap on the contribution side, by accepting foreign sourced donations under
the £500 threshold. Rajeev Syal, Brexit Party at High Risk of Accepting Illegal Funds, Says
Watchdog, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:3

Another problem in the U.K. regulatory scheme became apparent only after
the Brexit referendum, as Parliament struggled to approve a plan
operationalizing the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. Because
PPERA's third-party campaigner expenditure rules only apply during the
regulated period leading up to an election and only cover communications
intended to influence voters, paid advertisements placed outside that period
purportedly targeting elected officials are effectively unregulated. 299 What this
meant during the Brexit negotiations was that in early 2019, as the U.K.
Government tried to obtain approval of its exit plan, hundreds of thousands of
pounds worth of social media ads placed on Facebook and other platforms
pushing for a "no-deal" exit were not covered by U.K. disclosure or disclaimer
laws. 300 Transparency measures voluntarily adopted by Facebook show that a
group called "Britain's Future" purchased the ads, but because the ads were
placed outside of a regulated election period and purportedly targeted ministers
rather than voters (by telling them to "vote no" on the deal), the British people
30 1
were completely in the dark about who was funding the online campaign.
The United Kingdom, like the United States, is considering various ways to
address these issues. The prohibition on public disclosure of political
contributions in Northern Ireland has already been lifted, and the EC has asked
the Government to allow it to retroactively disclose what it knows about Brexit
referendum funding in Northern Ireland. 30 2 The U.K. Information
Commissioner, as well as the EC, has recommended that the Banks/Rock
Holdings situation be addressed by adopting the Neill Committee's original
proposal of requiring U.K.-based subsidiaries of foreign corporations to
demonstrate that their U.K. businesses generate sufficient revenue to cover their
political spending. 30 3 There also are proposals to improve the ability of political
parties, candidates, and third-party campaigners to verify the source of the funds
they receive, 30 4 to tighten rules regarding the flow of money between Northern
Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and to close the gaps created by the
12/nigel -farage -brexit-party- at-high -risk-of-accepting -illegal-donations -watchdog [https:
//perma.cc/2H9N-C9TK].
299
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300
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Facebook, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/apr/
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wording of the third-party campaigner registration threshold and foreign
donation ban. The EC also has recommended studying whether and how the
regulated period should be adjusted, to better capture the nature of today's
ongoing online influence campaigns.
3. Foreign Source Exclusion Recap
Once again, there is much in these reform proposals warranting comparative
consideration, and very little that is barred by current U.S. constitutional law.
Legislators in the United States are struggling with the same question as their
U.K. counterparts regarding how to define foreignness in regard to subsidiaries
of foreign held corporations. 30 5 The Neill Committee's careful and
comprehensive consideration of the underlying justifications for foreign source
bans, and its nuanced application of that justification when defining the relevant
political communities in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, surely will be
of value to U.S. advocates as cases like Bluman wind their way to the Supreme
Court. The Northern Ireland experience also offers a useful comparison as U.S.
courts work to define the appropriate scope of the abuse and harassment
exceptions to U.S. disclosure laws. Finally, the FEC, which has struggled with
the broader question of how to justify a foreign source ban in referendums (when
there is no candidate to "corrupt") would benefit from the rich discussion of this
issue engaged in by the Neill Committee and continuing today as the United
Kingdom modifies its rules for non-candidate referendums and perpetual
306
campaigns.
The United Kingdom, in turn, could learn from the extensive experience the
United States has had with a regulatory system not restricted to a defined preelection period. 30 7 The U.S. system has grappled for decades with the problems
associated with balancing this type of ongoing regulation with the need to
30 8
maintain both donor privacy and space for robust political speech.
Lawmakers in the United States have done this in the shadow of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, but the same normative challenges
exist regardless of that judicial overlay. 30 9 The United Kingdom could benefit
from this experience when contemplating whether and how to extend its own
regulatory regime.

305

See DISCLOSE Act of 2017, S. 1585, 115th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (2017) (using an
unwieldy definition to articulate foreignness). The FEC determined that domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations can engage in some election -related activities but cannot
do so using funds from foreign nationals. Martin, supra note 189. Foreign nationals also may
not participate in the decision-making process regarding any such activities. Id.
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D. Content Exclusions
Unlike source exclusions, content exclusions restrict communications on
the basis of what they say. 3 10 They are the most controversial type of regulation,
and invariably generate accusations of censorship, particularly in the United
States. 3 11 This also is the class in the taxonomy in which U.S. and U.K. laws are
the most distinct. But it oversimplifies both U.S. and U.K. law to believe that
the two systems are so different that there is no fruitful ground, even here, for
comparative study. As shown below, despite its frequent insistence to the
contrary, U.S. First Amendment law tolerates content-based regulation in many
contexts, and recent content-based reform proposals in the United Kingdom are
far less far-reaching than they can sound (to American ears) on first impression.
1. Content Exclusions in the United States
It is black letter law that the First Amendment requires strict scrutiny of
regulations distinguishing speech on the basis of its content. 3 12 Little else is
clear about this area, however, including the basic question of how to determine
whether a law is or is not content-based. 3 13 There also are numerous exceptions
to the strict scrutiny rule, and sometimes even content-based regulations
314
subjected to strict scrutiny survive and are upheld as constitutional.
These legal nuances take several forms. First, there are several contentbased types of speech, such as perjury and fraud, that are considered
categorically outside the protection of the First Amendment. 315 Regulation and
even prohibitions of these categories of speech are constitutionally acceptable
as long as they are viewpoint neutral. 3 16 Second, even constitutionally protected
speech can be regulated in some situations if the regulation advances a
substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, such as prohibiting
the use of profanity in governmental buildings or prohibiting harassment in
public workplaces. 3 17 Third, speech can be regulated on the basis of its content
if it presents a clear, serious, and imminent danger to people or property-the
3 18
classic example of which is falsely crying "fire" in a crowded theater.
310 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 27 (2015).
311 d. at 2226 ("Content-based laws those that target speech based on its
communicative content
3121Id.

are presumptively un-constitutional .....

313 See, e.g., id. at 2227 ("Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious,
defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining
regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the
message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.").
3 14

See Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive

in FirstAmendment Doctrine,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 444 n.86 (1996).
3 15
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 84 (1992).
3 16

3 17
3 18

See id.

See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Additionally, in exceptional cases, even viewpoint-based regulations can
survive strict scrutiny review and be upheld as constitutional, as long as the
regulation is sufficiently narrowly drawn to advance a compelling interest, such
319
as criminalizing "true threats" against the life of the President.
Each of these doctrines is complex and contested; the important point for
current purposes is to illustrate that despite its frequently absolutist rhetoric,
U.S. constitutional law permits content-based restrictions for a variety of
reasons under a variety of doctrines. These doctrines have been applied even in
the realm of political communications. 320 The clearest example of this is the
long-standing acceptance of state laws banning campaigning in or near polling
stations. 3 21 All fifty U.S. states have such laws, many of which have been in
place for more than 100 years. 322 Although its reasoning has varied, the
Supreme Court has consistently upheld these laws as long as they are
3 23
reasonable, viewpoint neutral, and not overly broad.
Efforts to regulate campaign speech on the basis that it is misleading or
untruthful have had more mixed success. The Supreme Court's most recent
decision in this area, United States v. Alvarez, involved the Stolen Valor Act, a
federal statute that penalized falsely claiming to hold certain types of military
honors. 324 In a split decision, a plurality of justices struck down the law. 3 25 In
doing so, they refused to accept the government's argument that false speech,
like perjury and other existing content-based exclusions, is categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment. 3 26 The plurality also refused to apply a
reduced standard of review just because the speech being regulated was
verifiably false. 327 Instead, the plurality held that laws punishing false
statements will be subject to strict scrutiny unless there is an additional "legally
cognizable harm" associated with the false statement justifying less rigorous
review. 328 The plurality opinion gave several examples of laws that fulfill this
criteria, including perjury laws (which protect the integrity of the courts), laws
prohibiting misrepresenting yourself as a representative of the government
(which protect the integrity of governmental processes), and anti-fraud laws
329
(which protect against consumer and financial harms).
Alvarez is a mixed bag for content-based election law reform proposals. The
plurality was plainly skeptical of applying anything less than strict judicial

319 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 08 (1969).
320
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1883 (2018).
321 See id.
322 Id.

323 Compare id., with Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 98 (1992).
324 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713 (2012).
325 Id. at 730.

326Id. at 719 20.
327 Id. at 716.
328 Id. at 719.
329 Id. at 720.
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scrutiny to new types of content-based regulations of speech. 33 The Justicesincluding the dissenting Justices-expressed particular concern that content331
based rules in the political realm risk chilling protected political speech.
Nonetheless,
the plurality's
recognition that preventing
fraud,
misrepresentation, and the integrity of governmental processes are cognizable
harms justifying less rigorous judicial scrutiny may leave open a path for a
332
carefully crafted false statement rule even in the electoral realm.
An earlier Supreme Court case, Brown v. Hartlage, shows one possible
approach. 333 In Hartlage,the Court considered a Kentucky law that punished a
candidate (Brown) for promising to take a smaller salary than entitled to if
elected. 334 Brown apparently made the statement without realizing that state law
prohibited him from taking a salary reduction. 335 Brown won the election, and
the losing candidate claimed Brown's statement violated the state Corrupt
Practices Act, which among other things penalized candidates for state office
from making false or misleading statements. 336 The state courts sided with
Brown's opponent, and nullified the election. 337 Brown appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing that applying the Corrupt Practices Act to his situation
violated the First Amendment. 338 The Supreme Court agreed with Kentucky that
protecting the integrity of elections was a compelling interest and that
"demonstrable falsehoods," even in the context of political campaigns, do not
have the same protection as truthful statements. 33 9 Nonetheless, the Court
invalidated the application of the law to Brown's statement because there had
been no showing that it had been made in bad faith, with knowledge that it was
340
false, or with "reckless disregard" of its truth.
This language borrows heavily from U.S. defamation law. Defamation law
has had a constitutional component in the United States since 1965 when the
Supreme Court held in New York Times v. Sullivan that defamation law could
341
not be used to punish minor, unintentional untruths about public officials.
Instead, the Sullivan Court said, the First Amendment protects even defamatory
statements about public officials as long as the statements are not made with
"actual malice." 342 As echoed by the Court in Hartlage,343 "actual malice" is
330

See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 20.
331Id. at 750 51 (Alito, J., dissenting).
332 Id.at 720.
333 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 46-47 (1982).
334 Id.
335
Id. at 48.
336

Id.at 49. The argument was that the statement was misleading because the salary was

set by law and the winning candidate could not change it. Id.at 50.
337
ld. at 50-51.
33 8

Id. at 52.

339 Brown, 456 U.S. at 52, 60.
340
ld. at 6l 62.
341 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 80 (1964).
342Id. at 279 80.
343
See Brown, 456 U.S. at 61.
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defined as making false statements of material fact with either actual knowledge
or reckless disregard of the statement's truth or falsity. 344 Speakers are thereby
constitutionally protected from liability for unintentional or even negligent
errors, minor untruths, and non-factual statements such as satire, opinion, and
hyperbole. 345 This doctrine does not protect intentional lies. 346 Indeed, it does
just the opposite: an intentional lie about a verifiable material fact is precisely
34 7
what can be punished under Sullivan.
States have relied on this distinction when defending state laws regulating
untrue statements in election campaigns. The federal appellate courts, however,
349
34 8
appear-at least at first blush-to be unconvinced. The Eighth and Sixth
Circuit courts of appeals have struck down prosecutions under false speech laws
in Minnesota and Ohio, respectively. In each case, state courts had interpreted
the state statutes as applying only to speech meeting the Sullivan standard, but
the federal courts nonetheless held that the First Amendment barred the state
350
prosecution.
But these decisions are less determinative than they appear, for two reasons.
First, in each case, the underlying statement involved was not obviously
verifiable as true or false. In Ohio, the underlying statement accused a member
of Congress of voting for "taxpayer-funded abortion" by supporting the
Affordable Care Act-a complex statute that expanded reproductive health care
351
generally but did not specifically appropriate federal funds for abortion care.
The Minnesota case was more complicated, but the court seemed skeptical that
the underlying statements giving rise to the complaint had been demonstrably
false. 352 Neither case, therefore, presented a crisp opportunity for a court to
evaluate the core question of whether a narrowly drawn statute applied only to
false statements of verifiable fact would pass First Amendment scrutiny.
Second, even while striking down the statutes in front of them the courts in
both cases affirmed that states are not powerless to regulate all false or
344 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. The doctrine was later extended to public figures, including
limited purpose "public figures." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 36 (1974);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
345 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 80.
346
See id. at 283.
347 Id.

348 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621,636 (8th Cir. 2011).
349 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016).
350
See id. at 472 76; 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 636. In the United States, a state
supreme court has authority to determine the meaning of a state law, but federal courts
determine whether the statute so interpreted violates federal statutory or constitutional law.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 66 (1964) (finding Alabama defamation
law unconstitutional); see also State Courts vs. Federal Courts, JUDICIAL LEARNING CTR.,
https://judiciallearningcenter.org/state-courts-vs-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/4GPGNQUG].
351 Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 470.
352
The Eighth Circuit opinion put the word "false" in quotations when discussing the
statements underlying the earlier proceeding. See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:3

misleading statements in the political realm. The Eighth Circuit unequivocally
rejected any such interpretation of its decision, stating "[w]e do not, of course,
hold today that a state may never regulate false speech in this context." 353 The
Sixth Circuit likewise emphasized that the plaintiff was not asserting (and it was
not affirming) a constitutional "right to lie" in election campaigns. 354 Instead,
both courts held only that false campaign statements are not categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment-a relatively unremarkable holding,
echoed by the Supreme Court in Alvarez. 355 Additionally, both courts readily
acknowledged that preserving the integrity of democratic elections is a
compelling governmental interest, even though the states had failed to
356
sufficiently narrow the reach of the statutes in the cases presented.
These cases leave open the possibility that a carefully drawn and applied
regulation of false or misleading campaign speech could be upheld, even if
subjected to heighted review. Which is not to say it would be: laws restricting
political speech rarely survive judicial review in the United States, and a deep
skepticism of any governmental process adjudicating the truth or falsity of
political statements undergirds all of these opinions. But a carefully crafted law
advancing a well-defined interest in protecting the integrity of elections could
address some of the worst abuses in the U.S. system.
There are examples of what such a law might look like. In striking down the
Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit provided a detailed critique of why the Ohio statute
357
was overly broad, and what a more narrowly tailored statute would look like.
Election law scholar Richard Hasen has argued that a statute regulating only
intentionally false statements involving easily verifiable factual statements
(such as intentionally misstating the date of the election) could be sufficiently
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest in protecting the right to
vote. 358 Targeting actual "fake news"-completely made up stories designed for
commercial rather than political purposes-is another possible approach, as is
353
354

Id.at 636.
See Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 473.

3551d. at 473; see 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 636; United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 722 (2012).
356281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 636; Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 473 74. The
Sixth Circuit in particular emphasized the importance of "protecting 'voters from confusion
and undue influence,' and 'ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by
fraud."' Id.at 473 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S 191, 199 (1992)).
357 Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 474. Specifically, the court found the Ohio law
was insufficiently narrowly tailored in four ways: (1) it could take up to six months to resolve
a complaint, which undercut arguments that the law protected election integrity; (2) anyone
could initiate a complaint, and there was no screening for frivolous complaints, meaning the
process could be weaponized by competing campaigns; (3) the law applied to non-material
statements; (4) the law applied to "commercial intermediaries" such as billboard companies
who were messengers rather than speakers. Id. at 474 76.
358 Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV. 53, 57 (2013); see also William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and
the FirstAmendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 287 (2004).
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limiting a false statement law to micro-targeted online advertising not seen
beyond its target audience and therefore less amenable to more narrowly tailored
counter-speech remedies.3 59 Designing and enacting any such rule would be
challenging, but nothing in current U.S. law takes it completely off the
constitutional table.
2. Content Exclusions in the United Kingdom
Content-based exclusions do not face the same judicial scrutiny in the
United Kingdom as in the United States, but even in the United Kingdom such
laws do face some judicial skepticism. Courts in the United Kingdom have
imposed reasonableness and proportionality restraints on speech regulations
enforcing primary legislation, and Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights creates a judicially protected freedom of expression right
applicable in the United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act 1998.360 More
generally, U.K. courts, like their U.S. counterparts, recognize the special
importance in a democracy of free and robust discussion of political issues, and
are sensitive to that when evaluating content-based regulations of political
speech.

36 1

Nonetheless, it is plainly true that U.K. lawmakers have more leeway to
regulate false or misleading campaign speech than do their U.S. counterparts.
The RPA prohibits the use of fraud or "undue influence" in political campaigns,
and U.K. courts have permitted prosecution under those provisions for things
like distributing an election flyer falsely claiming to have been created by a rival
party, and making false statements that a candidate has withdrawn from an
election.3 62 But the most extensive judicial treatment of content-based
restrictions on political speech in the United Kingdom has come under
359

See Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 474 (holding that laws may not "pass
constitutional muster because they are not narrowly tailored in their (1) timing, (2) lack of a
screening process for frivolous complaints, (3) application to non-material statements, (4)
application to commercial intermediaries, and (5) over- inclusiveness and underinclusiveness").
360 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 1.3, sch. 1 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1998/42/contents [https://perma.cc/Q33Z-NQ5R]. Under the HRA, a declaration
of incompatibility does not invalidate primary legislation, nor does such a declaration affect
the parties' obligation to comply with it. Id. § 4. Instead, it triggers a review process through
which the Government may amend the legislation. Id. The declaration itself entails no legal
obligation on the Government or Parliament to make any such amendments. Id.
361 See Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [148] (opinion of
Baroness Hale); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 200 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK); Heesom v. Public Services Ombudsman for Wales [2014] EWHC
(Admin) 1504 [34] (Wales); see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245,
33 (1979).
362
See generally PROTECTING THE DEBATE, supra note 5 (recommending sanctions for
the electoral offence of intimidation); see also R v. Rowe ex parte Mainwaring [1992] 1
WLR 1059, 1059 n.1.
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Section 106 of the RPA. 363 Section 106 prohibits any person from attempting to
influence an election by making or publishing "false statement[s] of fact" in
relation to a candidate's "personal" character. 364 Candidates who violate this
provision are subject to civil fines and can be barred from standing for elective
office. 365 Courts also have the authority to set aside elections tainted by
366
violations of the statute.
Prosecutions under Section 106 have been few, but they have been sustained
by U.K. courts. 3 67 The decision in Watkins v. Woolas is illustrative. 36 8 In
Woolas, the Parliamentary Election Court considered whether to set aside an
election result on the grounds that the winning candidate violated
Section 106.369 The underlying allegation involved three statements made by the
winning candidate (Woolas) about his opponent (Watkins): that Watkins had
failed to condemn the actions of violent Muslim extremists, had actively
solicited the support of such extremists, and had reneged on a promise to live in
370
the constituency district in which he was standing.
The court determined that all three statements, in context, were intentionally
false statements of fact. 37 1 It further found that Woolas had no reasonable
grounds for believing they were true and that he did not in fact believe them to
be so. 3 7 2 The court then found the first two statements were made with
intentional dishonesty. 373 Finally, the court held that the first two statements
were about Watkins's personal character (which are covered by Section 106),
rather than his political behavior or opinions (which are not). 374 The court

363 Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2, § 106(1) (UK), http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/data.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE].
364 Id.

365 Jacob Rowbottom, Lies, Manipulation and Elections

Controlling False Campaign

Statements, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507, 508 (2012).

366 Representation of the People Act § 159(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1983/2/data.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE].
367
Rowbottom, supra note 365, at 509 n. 10.
36 8
See Watkins v. Woolas [2010] EWHC (QB) [208].
3691d. at [1] [6]. Woolas was heard by the U.K. Parliamentary Election Court, a court
constituted under U.K. law for the purpose of hearing certain election disputes. Woolas v.
Parliamentary Election Court, [2010] EWHC (Admin) 3169, [2011] 2 WLR 1362, 1363 64
(Eng.). Decisions of the court are appealable only as to errors of law. Id.
370Watkins v. Woolas [2010] EWHC (QB) 2702 [19] [23].
371 Id. at [207]. The statements were made in leaflets and said that "extremist Muslim
activists" had targeted Woolas with violence. Id. at [64]. They included photographs of
Watkins next to photographs of demonstrators holding placards calling for the beheading of
people who insult Islam. Id. A second leaflet stated that "one extremist website" had created
a competition for the most "imaginative ways to kill [Phil Woolas]" and that Watkins had
not condemned the website or the group that created it. Id. at [96] [97].
3721d. at [207].
373
1d. at [195], [203].
374

1d. at [82], [94] [95].
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therefore determined that the first two statements had violated Section 106 and
375
that the election should be set aside.
Woolas appealed, arguing that applying Section 106 to his statements
violated the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 376 The U.K. appellate court disagreed. 377 Citing
an earlier case (Bowman v. United Kingdom37 8), the court agreed with Woolas
that free elections and freedom of expression are the "bedrock" of democracy,
and that Article 10 required judges to carefully review laws restricting a
candidate's speech during an election period. 379 But, the court went on, free and
fair elections also require protecting the right of the electorate to make its
choices based on the candidates' competing positions and policy arguments, not
on false statements about a candidate's personal character. 380 Section 106, with
its limited focus on exactly that, was therefore a proportionate limitation on the
freedom of expression protected by Article 10.381
The U.K. courts' more permissive approach to content-based regulations of
political speech has been tested elsewhere as well. R (ProLife Alliance) v.
British Broadcasting Corporation involved the BBC's refusal to show a
broadcast submitted by the Pro Life Alliance, a U.K. political party. 382 As a
political party registered under PPERA, the ProLife Alliance was entitled to
make a broadcast on the BBC during the election period. 3 83 But the ad it
submitted included what the court described as "prolonged and graphic images
of... mangled and mutilated" aborted fetuses. 384 The BBC refused to broadcast
the ad, citing its statutory power and duty to maintain standards of taste,
385
decency, and non-offensiveness in its programing.
The ProLife Alliance sued, arguing that the BBC's refusal to broadcast the
ad because of its content violated Article 10.386 The case reached the U.K.
Supreme Court, which upheld the BBC's decision. 387 Lord Nicholls' lead
opinion acknowledged that Article 10 required that the content-based
restrictions imposed by the BBC be justified, particularly when used to censor
at [207] [208].
Woolas v. Parliamentary Election Court [2010] EWHC (Admin) 3169, [2011] 2
WLR
1362, 1362 (Eng.).
377
d. at 1363 64.
378 Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
379
Woolas [2010] EWHC 3169 [89].
3801. at 1391.
38 1
1d. at [91].
382R (ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23, [2],
[2004] 1 AC 185 (appeal taken from Eng.).
375d.

376

3831d. at [4]
3841d. at [3].

[9].

385 Broadcasting Act 1996, c. 55, § 108(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uk
pga/ 1996/55/contents [https://perma.cc/9TG8-FJSW]; ProLife Alliance [2003] UKHL
23, [2].
386
ProLife Alliance [2003] UKHL 23, [2].
3871Id.
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the broadcast of a political party during an election campaign. 388 But, Lord
Nicholls went on, nothing in U.K. law or Article 10 jurisprudence entitled
political parties to an exemption from a generally applicable prohibition on the
broadcast of offensive material. 389 A concurring opinion by Lord Hoffman
elaborated on this point, noting that the primary right protected by Article 10 in
the context of a generally applicable prohibition is a right to not be denied access
390
to the airways on "discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable" grounds.
Because the BBC's decision was based in preexisting and non-discriminatory
3 91
standards, it was lawful under the ECHR's Article 10 jurisprudence.
The upshot of these cases is that while U.K. courts, like their U.S.
counterparts, recognize the importance in a democracy of robust discussion of
political issues, and consequently engage in more searching review of contentbased restrictions involving political speech, 392 they also are more accepting of
restrictions designed to protect democratic discourse from false, misleading, or
offensive campaigning.
Reform proposals in the United Kingdom calling for content-based
prohibitions on false or harmful election communications draw on this leniency.
Many of these proposals came together in an April 2019 report, the "Online
Harms White Paper," presented to Parliament by the Home Department working
in conjunction with the Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee. 393 The
report identifies four kinds of online harms: online harassment and bullying,
terroristic propaganda and recruitment, political disinformation, and gang and
criminal glorification. 394 The core proposal in the report is that Parliament
should impose a statutory duty of care on large social media and digital data
companies requiring them to adopt risk-based and proportionate policies
addressing the most egregious online harms immediately, while gradually
developing better practices in regard to lesser harms. 395 The law would not
require companies to engage in any particular specified acts. 396 Instead, the legal
obligation imposed would require companies to create, follow, and enforce

3881d. at [6] [8].
3891Id. at [10].
3901d. at [62].
391 Id. at 185. In a dissenting speech, Lord Scott disagreed. Id. at [83] [99]. Lord Scott
would have required the BBC directors to conduct a proportionality review before rejecting
the broadcast, and argued that the interest of preserving public decency and avoiding offense
was insufficient to justify restricting the speech of a political party and therefore
incompatible with Article 10. Id.
392
See Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [148] (appeal taken
from Eng.).
393
HM Gov'T, ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER (Apr. 2019), https://assets.publishing
service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/79 3360/Online
_HarmsWhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ5X-UMSD].
394

395
396

1d. at 5.

Id. at 7 8.
See id. at 7.
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practices sufficient to meet the statutory duty of care. 39 7 An independent
regulator would oversee compliance, generate public reports regarding company
39 8
practices, and impose fines and liability on non-compliant companies.
Despite its rather ambitious scope, many of the recommendations in the
report are relatively benign. 3 99 In several areas, the report's most important
contribution is to highlight existing regulatory gaps allowing activity to go
unpunished online even when it would be regulated or prohibited under current
law if occurring offline. 400 For example, as discussed above, the RPA already
prohibits fraud and undue influence in elections, and penalizes candidates for
40 1
making false statements of fact about the character of their opponents.
Campaign statements in the United Kingdom also are subject to criminal and
civil laws restricting copyright, libel, contempt and obscenity, and similar
existing prohibitions against the incitement of racial or religious hatred. 40 2 Yet
as the "Online Harms" report highlights, these generally applicable rules are
rarely enforced online. Several of the suggestions in the report aim merely to
close that gap.
In regard to digital disinformation, the report goes further and suggests that
the rapid spread of online disinformation designed to mislead voters or
undermine democratic processes may call for new regulatory controls. 403 It
grounds this observation in the "unprecedented effectiveness" of online actors
to use false information online to manipulate public opinion through
automation, anonymity, and fraud. 40 4 Even here, though, the report notes that a
precedent already exists in British law for regulating covert efforts to manipulate
public opinion, and proposes that those same principles guide any new approach
40 5
to online regulation.
The "Online Harms" report concludes by making several relatively modest
recommendations about how social media companies could meet any statutory
duty of care imposed by future legislation. 40 6 It suggests they adopt terms of
service prohibiting users from misrepresenting their identity on social media for
the purpose of disseminating or amplifying disinformation, use automated Al
techniques to find and remove fake news items, develop systems to evaluate the
trustworthiness of content providers, make more reliable content more visible
to users, and require users to be notified when they are interacting with
397 Id.

398 Id. at 59.
399
See HM GOV'T,
400

supra note 393, at 5 10.

See id.

401 Representation of the People Act 1983 c. 2, § 106 (UK), http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents [https://perma.cc/MD3J-RXSE].
402 See id.
403
HM GOV'T, supra note 393, at 24.
404 Id.

405 Id. The report points to the obligation of television regulators under the Broadcasting
Act 1990 to ensure broadcasts do not include subliminal messages designed to influence
individuals
without them being aware. Id.
406
1d. at 70-71.
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automated accounts or looking at paid content. 4 7 None of these suggestions are
legally extraordinary, and all deserve at least some comparative consideration.

3. Content Exclusions Recap
The law regulating content-based exclusions is meaningfully different in the
United States and United Kingdom, and these differences are highly relevant to
the reform proposals under consideration in each country. Regulators in the
United Kingdom have much more flexibility than their U.S. counterparts in
devising content-based strategies to deal with online electioneering and foreign
interference. But this does not mean that there is no value in comparative study,
even here. Courts in the United States have done a great deal of thinking about
the value and risks of content-based regulation of political speech, and U.K.
regulators would surely benefit from careful consideration of this jurisprudence.
The U.S. experience here is extensive, and valuable even to those who disagree
with the ultimate conclusions reached.
At least some recommendations in the "Online Harms" report also should
have value to U.S. reformers, especially those that resonate within U.S.
consumer protection, fraud, and defamation law. Paying attention to how these
suggestions are operationalized in the United Kingdom may stimulate new
thinking about how they could be implemented within existing U.S. law. Even
recommendations unlikely to be constitutional in the United States if imposed
on social media companies by law may nonetheless provide case studies for
social media companies looking for ways to better manage their online space.
Facebook, for example, already is experimenting with providing information
about the reliability of content providers, 40 8 and Twitter has taken some steps
toward eliminating imposter accounts and bot-nets. 40 9 Thus, while the legal
environment around content-based regulations is very different in the United
States and United Kingdom, the two countries nonetheless have things to learn
from each even here.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2016 elections in the United States and United Kingdom revealed how
challenging it is in both nations to effectively regulate online and foreign
election interference under current law. Despite the urgent need to remedy this,

widespread assumptions about America's "First Amendment Exceptionalism"
407 Id.
408 Jessica Guynn, Facebook Is Judging How Trustworthy You Are: What You Need to
Know, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news /2018/
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Alyssa Newcomb, Twitter Is PurgingMillions of Fake Accounts and Investors Are
Spooked, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/twitter-
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have left regulators, lawmakers, and reform advocates in both countries
relatively uninterested in each other's efforts. This Article hopes to change that.
Evaluating the reform proposals being considered in each nation through a
common taxonomy enables us to see more clearly where differences between
the legal systems of the two nations do and do not pose system-specific
challenges to different types of reform proposals, and to direct future
comparative efforts accordingly.
As the above analysis shows, there are several areas where further
comparative study would be valuable. In regard to public education, few legal
barriers hinder reforms in either country, and advocates in the United States and
United Kingdom should freely share and learn from each other's efforts. In
regard to increased transparency, the United States can learn from the United
Kingdom's experience with lower disclosure thresholds for individual donors
and its wider experience with pay-to-produce rather than pay-to-place
thresholds for transparency rules. The United States also could benefit from
Scotland's experience in actually implementing a comprehensive online imprint
requirement. The United Kingdom, in turn, can learn from the decades of
experience the United States has in trying to fairly and effectively distinguish
regulated campaigning from unregulated political speech. The United Kingdom
also may benefit from studying the successes and failures of the more detailed
and ongoing reporting requirements common in the U.S. system.
Similar opportunities for constructive comparison exist in regard to foreign
source and content exclusions. Both nations are struggling with the definition of
"foreign" when defining a political community. There will be much to be
learned here as each country continues exploring the parameters of and
justifications for their respective foreign source bans. The United States also
could learn from the United Kingdom's longer history of regulating corporate
campaign spending, including the spending of domestic subsidiaries of foreignheld entities. Even in regard to content exclusions, where the basic law of the
two nations is the most different, there are areas where comparative study would
be valuable. Courts in the United Kingdom have done quite a bit of thinking
about how false statements of verifiable facts interfere with the right of voters
to make informed decisions based on accurate information. The United States
could learn from this when considering whether and how to craft narrow laws
penalizing egregious misrepresentation and fraud in the electoral realm. The
United Kingdom, in turn, may benefit from the extensive judicial and scholarly
literature in the United States documenting the risks of being too eager to adopt
broad prohibitions in this area.
The United States and the United Kingdom share a long tradition of
insightful comparative scholarship. While there are real and meaningful
differences between the legal regulation of campaign communications in the
United States and the United Kingdom, those differences present few barriers to
many of the most significant types of reform proposals being considered in each
country, so that tradition can and should continue through additional
comparative work in this critical area.

